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I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
[1] Merger and Acquisition
1
 or “M&A” deals are both figuratively and 
literally big business, where the stakes for the organization are often the 
highest.
2
  While casual observers might expect that the importance 
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1
 And by extension, asset purchases, divestitures, and bankruptcy transactions.  See DUE 
DILIGENCE FOR GLOBAL DEAL MAKING: THE DEFINITIVE GUIDE TO CROSS-BORDER 
MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS, JOINT VENTURES, FINANCINGS, AND STRATEGIC 
ALLIANCES 140, 153 (Arthur H. Rosenbloom ed., Bloomberg Press 2002); see also 
Fabrice Naftalski et al., Presentation at the International Association of Privacy 
Professionals Europe Data Protection Congress 2012: Multinational M&A and Asset 
Transactions: What You Need to Know before You Buy or Sell (Nov. 13-15, 2012). 
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attached to these deals makes each new deal the vanguard for 
incorporating metrics and practices regarding every efficiency and 
contingency, existing research demonstrates that this is decidedly not the 
case.  Instead, modern M&A practices are just now beginning to catch-up 
to new technologies by including data privacy (“DP”), information 
security (“IS”), e-Discovery,3 and information governance (“IG”)4 
concerns as discrete issues within the traditional due diligence paradigm.
5
  
Research further demonstrates that while parties may gain efficiencies in 
addressing each of these issues individually,
6
 there may be additional 
benefits from addressing them together—in addition to related or ancillary 
tax, financial accounting, and intellectual property deal considerations.
7
  In 
                                                                                                                                    
2
 See Lee Gomes, H-P’s IBM Envy Drives Deal, WALL ST. J., May 14, 2008, at B8. 
 
3
 e-Discovery refers to the preservation, review, and production of electronically stored 
information in the context of litigation and other regulatory matters; see Kenneth J. 
Withers, Risk Aversion, Risk Management, and the “Overpreservation” Problem in 
Electronic Discovery, 64 S.C. L. REV. 537, 538 (2013). 
 
4
 Andrew Haslam, Information Governance - Why Lawyers Should Take the Lead, 
LEXISNEXIS FUTURE L. BLOG (Mar. 31, 2014), 
http://blogs.lexisnexis.co.uk/futureoflaw/2014/03/information-governance-why-lawyers-
should-take-the-lead/, archived at http://perma.cc/Z7VD-6YMX (defining Information 
Governance as the “newer, shinier version of what used to be called Records Information 
Management . . . .  Both focus on managing the risks posed by organization information 
flows.”); see also The Sedona Conference, The Sedona Conference Commentary on 
Information Governance 4 (Conor R. Crowley ed., 2013). 
 
5
 See Daniel B. Garrie & Yoav M. Griver, Digital Issues in Mergers & Acquisitions, e-
Discovery, & Information Technology Systems, 19 WIDENER L. REV. 25, 28–29 (2009). 
 
6
 See Clay Deutsch & Andy West, A New Generation of M&A: A McKinsey Perspective 
on the Opportunities and Challenges, in PERSPECTIVES ON MERGER INTEGRATION 5, 6 
(McKinsey & Company 2010), available at 
http://www.mckinsey.com/client_service/organization/latest_thinking/mm_compendium-
new, archived at http://perma.cc/E36S-7HC7 (Value creation stems from, among other 
practices, “[c]apturing traditional combinational synergies, which includes efforts to 
achieve economies of scale and enhanced efficiency.”). 
 
7
 See Rosenbloom, supra note 1, at 54–55. 
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the right kind of transaction, this combination might just be the difference 
between success and failure. 
 
[2] We examine how DP, IS, e-Discovery, and IG are intertwined by 
their very operation, and show how evolving practices that address each 
concern separately without an overarching strategy suffer from, at the very 
least, inefficiencies—and may, at their worst, lead to non-compliance with 
court orders and regulatory guidance.  We argue that a strategic 
framework that incorporates these four issues in concert may provide an 
alternative method for analyzing and addressing these issues piecemeal, 
and that in some types of transactions (“Deals”), the framework’s 
application will most appropriately determine the cost of the Deal, 
evidence the maturity level of organization or asset targeted (the 
“Target”), and reduce risk for the future organization (the “Acquirer”) 
during and post-Deal.  However, we caution that while the procedures 
developed in this framework are scalable across Deals of different sizes 
and complexities, this is not a one-size-fits-all approach.  Instead, the size 
and complexity of the Deal will determine the extent to which the due 
diligence practitioners focus on the discrete aspects of the framework.  
Those determinations are ultimately left to the Acquirer or party 
undertaking the analysis. 
 
[3] An acquisition-type Deal structure, with a Target and Acquirer, is 
ideal for a strategic, cost-type evaluation as the traditional due diligence 
practice considers deal negotiation from a zero-sum perspective: that is, 
each issue (and associated cost) is apportioned to either the Acquirer or the 
Target.  Our evaluation also builds off of discrete fact patterns, developing 
equations which in turn provide rough calculations as to how much related 
efforts will actually cost when implemented by the Acquirer at the 
conclusion of the Deal. 
 
[4] The reality that many M&A deals do not achieve their planners’ 
aspirations
8
 indicates room for improvement in M&A practice.  The 
                                                     
8
 See JOHN T. PHILLIPS, MERGERS, ACQUISITIONS, DIVESTITURES AND CLOSURES: 
RECORDS AND INFORMATION MANAGEMENT CHECKLISTS 1 (ARMA International 
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structure and metrics presented in this paper are no panacea, but even 
modest improvements within traditional practice may impact the whole. 
Given the combination of the vast growth of information, the cost 
associated with the appropriate use and maintenance of that information, 
and the lack of a formalized structure for how to deal with that 
information in the context of M&A deals, even moderate considerations 
may have resounding effects.   
 
A.  The Best Time Will Always Be the Present 
 
[5] When organizations are spending money, there is an appetite for 
savings.  Where there is money on the table, there is a greater likelihood 
that it will be available to address otherwise unfunded liabilities, and a 
much better chance that Acquirers will be able to address the combined 
factors presented in this paper.  We also expect that, as hypothesized by 
other authors but not yet supported by scholarship, the more thorough the 
evaluation of tax, legal, and IT issues, the better the ultimate Deal 
performance.
9
 
 
[6] Aspirations aside, current research does not demonstrate direct, 
measurable results from additional due diligence.  Instead, the scholarship 
indicates that “a thorough evaluation of investment and financing issues, 
and legal, tax and IT compatibility” did not, in fact, directly improve Deal 
performance.
10
  However, this conclusion supports the notion that long-
term strategic value—rather than short-term deal costs—drives 
transactions.
11
  This conclusion is bolstered by anecdotal conversations 
                                                                                                                                    
Education Foundation 2011), available at 
http://www.armaedfoundation.org/pdfs/2011_Rev_RIM_Checklists.pdf, archived at 
http://perma.cc/QT9C-M8VE.   
 
9
 See Mohammad Faisal Ahammad & Keith W. Glaister, The Pre-Acquisition Evaluation 
of Target Firms and Cross Border Acquisition Performance, 22 INT’L BUS. REV. 894, 
898 (2013). 
 
10
 Id. at 902. 
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with deal participants: when our proposed framework was presented as a 
way to distill value, it was seen as valuable for presenting prospective 
costs which would be negotiated, but that was still just a balance sheet 
issue for dealmakers. 
 
[7] Dealmakers considered more pressing the strategic nature of the 
analysis along a maturity model spectrum,
12—where shortcomings 
uncovered through the application of the strategic framework provided 
both the costs associated with those shortcomings and a view into the 
operations of the Target; analogous to how a mechanic checking a car 
without proper maintenance determines how much it will take to fix the 
car, but also gains insight into the car’s owner.  Likewise, from an 
Acquirer’s perspective, even if the price is right, “the ability to buy [the 
Target] may have nothing at all to do with the capacity to own.”13 
  
[8] Based on our research, real-world experience, interviews, and 
practitioner feedback, there may be real value associated with the 
application of this paper’s strategic framework which, for an appropriate 
and willing Acquirer, would pay for itself (many times over) by providing 
the following:  
 
 Demonstrating the maturity level of the Target vis-à-vis DP, 
IS, e-Discovery, and IG issues; 
 Determining greater cost certainty for the Deal’s bottom line, 
positioning the Acquirer nearer to paying the appropriate 
amount for the Target; 
                                                                                                                                    
11
 See MITCHELL LEE MARKS & PHILIP H. MIRVIS, JOINING FORCES: MAKING ONE PLUS 
ONE EQUAL THREE IN MERGERS, ACQUISITIONS, AND ALLIANCES ix (2d ed. 2010).  
 
12
 See AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF CERTIFIED PUBLIC ACCOUNTANTS, INC. (AICPA) & 
CANADIAN INSTITUTE OF CHARTERED ACCOUNTANTS (CICA), PRIVACY MATURITY 
MODEL 2 (2011), available at http://www.kscpa.org/writable/files/AICPADocuments/10-
229_aicpa_cica_privacy_maturity_model_finalebook.pdf, archived at 
http://perma.cc/U5UR-DP5Y. 
 
13
 Deutsch & West, supra note 6, at 5. 
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 Presenting integration issues at a more opportune time and 
increasing the odds that the resulting entity operates as 
planned; and 
 Decreasing the Acquirer’s risk. 
 
Proper consideration of these issues will also help those Deals in which, 
due to competition or secrecy, information from the Target and its 
employees is limited.  This consideration will make it more likely that the 
practitioner talks with the correct person, rather than a cooperative but 
ultimately uninformed one. 
 
B.  Surely This Has Been Done Before? 
 
[9] No.  The available literature provides few instances where these 
issues are addressed singly
14
 or in tandem in M&A practice; we have seen 
nothing documenting an omnibus approach.  Likewise, our collective 
experience indicates that, when the ideas supporting our strategic 
framework are incorporated into the due diligence practice, they are often 
treated as logical novelties.  This disregard may stem from a lack of 
systematic training in law school
15
 and the sometimes haphazard training 
endemic of a challenging system that assigns the responsibility for the due 
diligence assembly and review of information to the most junior attorneys 
at law firms and consulting companies. 
 
[10] These attorneys and professionals learn how to perform narrow 
due diligence tasks according to the existing paradigm and often do them 
well.  However, this delegated-down assignment creates much of the 
traditional M&A due diligence siloing we discuss further below.
16
  For 
                                                     
14
 See, e.g., Garrie & Griver, supra note 5, at 26. 
 
15
 See, e.g., Martin B. Robins, Intellectual Property and Information Technology Due 
Diligence in Mergers and Acquisitions: A More Substantive Approach Needed, 2008 U. 
ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL’Y 321, 325–26 (2008) (explaining the need for subject matter 
experts when performing the IP and IT due diligence process).  
 
Richmond Journal of Law & Technology                              Volume XXI, Issue 2 
 
7 
 
instance, a dedicated corporate practitioner is unlikely to consider complex 
litigation challenges, and even less likely to sua sponte incorporate DP and 
IS concerns into an existing due diligence slate of services.  But the 
continued development of DP, IS, e-Discovery, and IG practices, 
regulations, and risks dovetailing with the continued application of 
Moore’s law to information growth17 makes consideration of this strategic 
framework a necessity for future due diligence practices.  Simply put, 
there will never be a better time to address these issues than present day: 
the application of the framework works to the benefit of the Acquirer, and 
any improvement in these areas should be helpful.  Unlike many of the 
horse-trading negotiations in the due diligence context, improvements in 
DP, IS, e-Discovery, and IG are net positives. 
 
[11] As briefly mentioned above, and discussed more fully below, the 
application of the strategic framework determines and apportions funds to 
cover costs and informs the Acquirer of the maturity of the Target.  While 
this work alone is supported by findings indicating that financial and 
technical assessments are important aspects of due-diligence, they do not 
determine Deal success.
18
  Thankfully, the Acquirer’s use of the strategic 
                                                                                                                                    
16
 See Douglas B. Schrock & Kevin Culp, Merging the Merger Functions: Due Diligence 
and Integration Planning Complement Each Other, MIDMARKET ADVANTAGE 7, 8 
(Crowe Horwath 2008), available at http://www.crowehorwath.net/crowe-horwath-
global/insights/insights-
assets/merging_the_merger_functions__due_diligence_and_integration_planning_compl
ement_each_other.aspx, archived at http://perma.cc/BG57-HVKZ (discussing avoidance 
of siloing of work during the due diligence phase of acquisition by integration of due 
diligence and integration teams to optimize results of an acquisition).  
 
17
 See Withers, supra note 3, at 540 (citing Gordon E. Moore, Cramming More 
Components onto Integrated Circuits, 38 ELECTRONICS 8 (1965), available at 
http://www.monolithic3d.com/uploads/6/0/5/5/6055488/gordon_moore_1965_article.pdf, 
archived at http://perma.cc/4ELK-6MZN (“Acting as both cause and effect in the 
explosion of digital information is the decreasing cost of digital storage capacity, in 
accordance with the venerated Moore’s Law, which predicted as early as 1965 that the 
capacity of digital information storage devices would double roughly every eighteen 
months.”)). 
 
18
 See Ahammad & Glaister, supra note 9, at 902. 
Richmond Journal of Law & Technology                              Volume XXI, Issue 2 
 
8 
 
framework should also return value by reducing risk, through increased 
regulatory (and e-Discovery related) compliance; maintaining information 
related to the Deal; and providing a more solid footing for those instances 
where there is a requirement to get an outside valuation study of the 
merger offer.
19
 
 
II.  BACKGROUND 
 
A.  Traditional M&A Practice 
 
[12] M&A (and other) Deals are done to capture synergies.
20
  Those 
synergies are best realized by the Acquirer using the right information,
21
 
captured in the right volume,
22
 in the correct context.
23
 
  
But while M&A 
activity is expected to realize greater economies of scale or improve 
efficiency by shifting the cost function, those types of expected benefits 
often fail to manifest.
24
  Deals flounder for a number of reasons, and while 
Due Diligence is no elixir,
25
 it is an easy process to critique ex post facto.  
                                                     
19
 See STANLEY FOSTER REED ET AL., THE ART OF M&A: A 
MERGER/ACQUISITION/BUYOUT GUIDE 391–92 (McGraw-Hill 4th ed. 2007). 
 
20
 See, e.g., PETER BLATMAN ET AL., THE ROLE OF INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY IN 
MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS (Deloitte M&A Consultative Services 2008), available at 
https://www.deloitte.com/view/en_by/by/221d1350a8efd110VgnVCM100000ba42f00aR
CRD.htm, archived at https://perma.cc/9ZUG-6VQ4. 
 
21
 See Andrew D. James et al., Integrating Technology into Merger and Acquisition 
Decision Making, 18 TECHNOVATION 563, 567, 570–71 (1998).  
 
22
 See, e.g., Ahammad & Glaister, supra note 9, at 895–98, 902 (suggesting that “the 
more the acquiring firm learns about the target firm through thorough due diligence the 
better will be cross border acquisition performance.”).  
 
23
 See ROBERT F. HARTLEY, MANAGEMENT MISTAKES AND SUCCESSES 319–20 (Lise 
Johnson ed., John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 10th ed. 2011).   
 
24
 See John Engberg et al., The Effect of Mergers on Firms’ Costs: Evidence from the 
HMO Industry, 44 Q. REV. ECON. & FIN. 574, 575–76, 592 (2004).  
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Multiple points of failure thus magnify the importance of the Due 
Diligence process from the perspective of the Acquirer, where the 
uncertain proposition of the Deal’s ultimate success relies upon 
appropriate use of the Due Diligence process (and its memorialization) to 
defend the rationale of the Deal, reduce the risks associated with both the 
Deal and the post-Deal going concern, and justify the costs paid and 
strategy envisioned in the Deal. 
 
[13] Due Diligence’s overarching rationale is to determine whether the 
Acquirer should even proceed with a given deal.  Based on whether the 
Target fits within the strategic aims of the Acquirer, the primary 
concern—which may also kill the deal—is whether the diligence 
demonstrates that the Target is misunderstood by Acquirer management, 
or presents incompatible business philosophy, or technological, cultural, 
or personal incompatibilities.
26
  This traditional “fit” practice properly 
considered the following characteristics of the Target:  
 
 Assets;  
 Contracts;  
 Customers;  
 Employee agreements;  
 Employee benefits;  
 Environmental issues;  
 Facilities, plant, and equipment;  
 Financial condition;  
 Foreign operations and activities;  
 Legal factors;  
 Product issues;  
 Supplier issues; and  
                                                                                                                                    
25
 See, e.g., Robert Sher, Why Half of All M&A Deals Fail, and What You Can Do About 
It, FORBES (Mar. 19, 2012, 4:09 PM), 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/forbesleadershipforum/2012/03/19/why-half-of-all-ma-
deals-fail-and-what-you-can-do-about-it/, archived at http://perma.cc/S5HB-Z53D. 
 
26
 See Robins, supra note 15, at 324. 
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 Tax issues.27 
 
Because of its broad application, the traditional fit practice was the best 
route to addressing the primary concern voiced by Acquirers to their 
business advisors: the determination that there were no “black holes” or 
unanticipated substantial liabilities not covered by warranties.
28
  
 
[14] While not primary to the process in the minds of Acquirers, the use 
of due diligence findings to negotiate price also serves as an important part 
of the Deal process.
29
  Here, negotiations regarding the price of the Deal 
are discussed in the form of a zero-sum-game.  If there is a cost associated 
with the merger, by contract or default one party will bear it.
30 
  Because 
there is a winner and a loser, both the Acquirer and Target may conduct 
independent valuation analyses to determine the Target’s worth.31  The 
focus of those efforts within traditional due diligence process has been the 
costs associated with the tangible, internal environment and an audit of the 
Target’s hard assets to determine potential liabilities as well as future 
projected growth scenarios following acquisition of the Target.
32
  These 
                                                     
27
 See LINDA S. SPEDDING, THE DUE DILIGENCE HANDBOOK: CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, 
RISK MANAGEMENT AND BUSINESS PLANNING 7–8 (CIMA Publishing 2009). 
 
28
 See Duncan Angwin, Mergers and Acquisitions across European Borders: National 
Perspectives on Preacquisition Due Diligence and the Use of Professional Advisers, 36 J. 
WORLD BUS. 32, 50 (2001), available at 
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1090951600000535, archived at 
http://perma.cc/U9J9-5B6N. 
 
29
 See, e.g., id. at 51. 
 
30
 See DONALD DEPAMPHILIS, MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS BASICS: NEGOTIATION AND 
DEAL STRUCTURING 136 (Academic Press 2011). 
 
31
 See PATRICK A. GAUGHAN, MERGERS, ACQUISITIONS, AND CORPORATE 
RESTRUCTURINGS 22 (John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 5th ed. 2011), available at 
http://download.e-bookshelf.de/download/0000/5806/40/L-G-0000580640-
0002383571.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/J9J4-D9PS. 
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issues are then implemented into a typical term sheet identifying the 
Acquirer and Target, the purchase price, and factors that may affect the 
Deal price prior to closing (such as changes in the target’s financial 
performance).
33
  The term sheet will also include the consideration paid by 
the Acquirer (i.e., cash or stock); who pays what expenses; other unique 
elements; and all major representations and warranties.
34
 
 
B.  The Maturation of M&A Practice Due Diligence 
 
[15] Concerns about due diligence in the 1980’s focused on cursory due 
diligence which led to deals that produced sobering results.
35
  In fact, 
some practitioners directly posited the hypothesis that a “lack of attention 
to pre-merger strategy setting, IT due diligence, post-merger IT planning 
and execution, as well as poor IT/business coordination, are dominant 
factors in explaining the empirical rate of M&A success” or their lack 
thereof, with findings consistent with that hypothesis.
36
  Certainly, better 
models of litigation issues led to the conclusion that, in some cases 
Targets were worth less than the book value.
37
  In some cases, Targets had 
uncertain and unknown liabilities, such as pending litigation, which once 
uncovered, made true value trail book value.
38
  Additional experience gave 
further certainty to some of these issues, and valuation techniques 
                                                                                                                                    
32
 See Michael G. Harvey & Robert F. Lusch, Expanding the Nature and Scope of Due 
Diligence, 10 J. BUS. VENTURING 5, 7 (1995). 
  
33
 See GAUGHAN, supra note 31, at 23. 
 
34
 See id. 
 
35
 See Harvey & Lusch, supra note 32, at 5. 
 
36
 BLATMAN ET AL., supra note 20. 
  
37
 See GAUGHAN, supra note 31, at 541. 
 
38
 See id.  
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improved.
39
 
 
[16] Twenty years ago, due diligence of Target IS and IT was carried 
out in less than 50% of Deals.
40
  In effect, period due diligence practices 
involving technology were little more than inventories of “IT staff 
numbers, hardware, software and communications capabilities of the 
target organization.”41  The quality and effectiveness of Target systems 
were overlooked or ignored, and practitioners did not evaluate Target 
information infrastructure, IS, or the skills-base of the Target employees.
42
  
Practices have improved somewhat in recent years, gradually expanding 
into practices that include, among other things, information technology 
and systems information in addition to the standard financial and legal 
data.
43
 
 
[17] This expansion has led to a due diligence practice that attempts to 
incorporate “both tangible and intangible dimensions” of each identified 
function.
44
  But practice has been slow to envisage the use of information 
as a separate function that itself bridges multiple functions.  Instead, its 
presence during Deals can become either a “major asset or a convoluted 
and confusing nightmare.”45 
 
[18] Present day practice is still maturing to consider this issue in a 
                                                     
39
 See, e.g., Peter McKiernan & Yasmin Merali, Integrating Information Systems After a 
Merger, 28 LONG RANGE PLAN. 54, 58 (1995). 
 
40
 See id.  
 
41
 Id.  
 
42
 See id. 
 
43
 See e.g., Harvey & Lusch, supra note 32, at 5. 
 
44
 Id. at 7, 9. 
 
45
 PHILLIPS, supra note 8, at 16. 
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constructive form, driven in part by burgeoning legal implications.
46
  
Properly used IT assets, and IG and Personally Identifiable Information 
(“PII”) policies and practices may arguably increase realized earning 
power from the Deal.  Their use to further strategic objectives—or hinder 
them—is also part of the diligence process.  Here, the reverse of the 
hidden liability issue discussed above exists, where the liquidation value 
of the Target does not directly measure, and may even mask, the earning 
power of the firm’s assets and the Target’s assets will further vary in 
value, depending on the Acquirer’s appropriate evaluation, incorporation, 
and use of those assets.
47
 
 
C.  Present-Day Practices 
 
[19] Modified, adapted diligence practices have led to better results in 
specific case studies where the parties identified and acted upon 
redundancies.
48
  In at least one merger between equals, redundancies were 
eliminated on both sides of the deal, with related decisions made before 
the Deal’s announcement.49  In that case, this led to a “profitable 
integration of the merger within a year.”50  But many unsuccessful efforts 
instead rely on the best of intentions and expectations that the new 
enterprise will simply absorb the costs and work associated with doing the 
                                                     
46
 See GAUGHAN, supra note 31, at 539 (citing Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 
873–75 (Del. 1985)) (“This ruling is significant because it affirms the need for a formal 
valuation analysis in all mergers, acquisitions, and LBOs.  Ultimately, then, the Smith v. 
Van Gorkom decision is important because it set forth, under the business judgment rule, 
the responsibilities of directors of public companies to have a thorough and complete 
valuation analysis conducted by an objective party, such as an investment bank or 
valuation firm.”). 
 
47
 See, e.g., GAUGHAN, supra note 31, at 542. 
 
48
 See HARTLEY, supra note 23, at 209. 
 
49
 See id. 
 
50
 Id.  
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post-deal work—expectations unsupported by data and practice. 
 
[20] In the most prevalent form, many organizations and aspiring 
Acquirers overly rely on citizen stewards acting outside formal, structured 
IG practices.  These false beliefs that enterprise information is or will be 
well-managed
51
 may undercut an evaluation into whether an Acquirer 
truly has sufficient resources manage the integration process.
52
  As one 
study noted, though participants had aspirations and beliefs that such 
internal efforts were truly successful, reports indicated that the extent to 
which internal resources, such as law department counsel and IT 
department staff members, actually play a role (in this case, in e-
Discovery related services) were in reality “‘negligible’ or ‘minor.’”53  
Therefore success in these areas does not happen organically, or by 
happenstance; there is a cost to a workable strategy that both develops and 
implements necessary change. 
 
[21] Current diligence practices which attempt to incorporate the issue 
of information use generally are still subject to traditional diligence 
limitations, among them the practice of limiting and sequestering the 
Acquirer’s team to an electronic data room, or a conference room filled 
with paper requested by the Acquirer’s due diligence team (the “DDT”).54  
Access to the Target’s key personnel is often limited to the data room as 
well, or the Acquirer may obtain “limited access to information on a 
                                                     
51
 See SAUL JUDAH ET AL., PREDICTS 2014: INFORMATION GOVERNANCE AND MDM ARE 
CRITICAL FOR DIGITAL TRANSFORMATION (Gartner 2013), available at 
https://www.gartner.com/doc/2628017/predicts--information-governance-mdm, archived 
at http://perma.cc/3Q6B-R4GC. 
 
52
 See, e.g., Sher, supra note 25. 
 
53
 NICHOLAS M. PACE & LAURA ZAKARAS, WHERE THE MONEY GOES: UNDERSTANDING 
LITIGANT EXPENDITURES FOR PRODUCING ELECTRONIC DISCOVERY 33 (Rand Institute for 
Civil Justice 2012), available at 
http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2012/RAND_MG1208.pdf, 
archived at http://perma.cc/5D4H-NEJR. 
 
54
 See DEPAMPHILIS, supra note 30, at 27. 
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password-protected website.”55 
 
[22] The data room remains “a poor substitute for a tour of the seller’s 
facilities [even with the advent of] [v]irtual data rooms . . . containing 
financial and other data relevant to the seller.”56  This type of access is 
even more constrained when the practitioners requesting interviews of 
specific personnel are not incorporating questions related to the issue of 
information use.  And while the answers to these issues might be provided 
only upon specific request, these issues affect every size and type 
organization.
57
 
 
D.  Changes Warrant Further Due Diligence Evolution 
 
[23] The data that Targets create and rely upon has grown and will 
continue to grow; that rate of growth is steadily accelerating.  Various 
experts hypothesize that the continued growth of storage capacity acts as 
both the cause for and effect of this growth in accord with the “venerated 
Moore’s Law, which predicted as early as 1965 that the capacity of digital 
information storage devices would double roughly every eighteen 
months.”58  In addition to the seeming ambrosia of deceptively cheap 
storage at initial stages of data aggregation (more on that later), different 
technologies also have a combinatory effect, where advances in multiple 
areas increase the amount of communication across those platforms, in 
effect continuing the same conversation across multiple media platforms 
and manifesting as a virtual skein the Gartner IT advisory firm labeled the 
“Nexus of Forces.”59 
                                                     
55
 Id. 
 
56
 Id. 
 
57
 See, e.g., JUDAH ET AL., supra note 51, at 1, 5. 
 
58
 Withers, supra note 3, at 540. 
 
59
 JUDAH ET AL., supra note 51, at 11 (“Nexus of Forces [NoF]” is “[t]he converging and 
mutually reinforcing social, cultural and technological factors that Gartner has identified 
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[24] A changing regulatory landscape has increased the risk associated 
with unknown DP, IS, e-Discovery, and IG practices, where commentators 
note that there are over 4,000 compliance regulations today in the United 
States alone.
60
  Alone and in combination, these regulations contemplate 
“[c]orporate governance, security breach notification, privacy and data 
protection, and industry-specific regulations—such as money-laundering 
or bribery laws”—while describing physical security measures, 
application enhancements, and record retention and preservation 
requirements.
61
 
                                                                                                                                    
as the Nexus of Forces—social networking, mobile communications, cloud computing 
and information—that drive fundamental changes across industries.  The Nexus of Forces 
causes fundamental disruption to the operational models, the business strategies and the 
collaboration patterns of organizations.”).  
 
60
 See STEVE PALOMINO & ART VANCIL, A PRACTICE AID FOR RECORDS RETENTION 3 
(AICPA Information Technology Section 2012), available at 
http://www.aicpa.org/InterestAreas/InformationTechnology/Resources/BusinessIntelligen
ce/DownloadableDocuments/Records_Retention_Mktg.pdf, archived at 
http://perma.cc/9YUK-WSZT (citing EMC Centera Governance Edition and Compliance 
Edition Plus, http://www.emc.com, archived at http://perma.cc/5V3B-QFLP).  
 
61
 DEBRA LOGAN ET AL., INFORMATION GOVERNANCE BEST PRACTICE: ADOPT A USE 
CASE APPROACH 6 (Gartner 2013), available at 
https://www.gartner.com/doc/2630023/information-governance-best-practice-adopt, 
archived at http://perma.cc/9SZC-KPU7; see also FRENCH CALDWELL, HYPE CYCLE FOR 
LEGAL AND REGULATORY INFORMATION GOVERNANCE 4 (Gartner 2013), available at 
https://www.gartner.com/doc/2556415/hype-cycle-legal-regulatory-information, archived 
at http://perma.cc/KCN6-34FS (“The U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission’s 
requirements for brokerages to retain and supervise email, social media and other 
electronic communications [and] [m]ultiple financial services regulations globally that 
require analyzing data from across multiple risk silos to determine overall risk and 
compliance exposures, including newly drafted social media risk management guidelines 
from the U.S. Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council [and] [a]mendments to 
the U.S. Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (FRCP) and the U.K. Civil Procedure Rules, 
which specifically call out electronically stored information [and] [s]ecurity breach 
privacy laws in the U.S. and Germany that require companies to notify customers that 
their personal information has been compromised [and] [a]nti-fraud, anti-bribery and 
anti-corruption laws in the U.S., the U.K., Germany and elsewhere.”). 
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[25] Responses to these regulations are complex as well, with 
organizations adding layers and layers of compliance to existing IT 
processes in the wake of new regulation, incorporating binding 
requirements, revised corporate and departmental policies, new controls 
that begin to overlap, and associated audits.  Some organizations facing 
these hurdles claim that “[t]here is no way to stay in compliance, 
safeguard privacy, protect IP or decrease litigation costs while responding 
to the appropriate legal challenges and regulatory requests outside of a 
unified information governance framework.”62  Under those circumstances 
and despite a lack of success, it is especially surprising that organizations 
still attempt to manage their own practices ]according to “functional, 
formal, and contractual convergence.”63  Acquirers may be better served 
assuming an environment of non-compliance for Targets, and instead 
working on determining an appropriate risk analysis methodology for 
post-Deal activities. 
 
E.  Data Privacy 
 
[26] As information connectivity has increased, so too have domestic 
and international data transfers and DP concerns.  Many United States-
specific public and private sector standards implicate the collection, 
transfer, and use of PII,
64
 including laws regulating the “transfer, use and 
                                                     
62
 LOGAN ET AL., supra note 61, at 6. 
 
63
 Arturo Bris & Christos Cabolis, Corporate Governance Convergence through Cross-
Border Mergers: The Case of Aventis, in CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND REGULATORY 
IMPACT ON MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS: RESEARCH AND ANALYSIS ON ACTIVITY 
WORLDWIDE SINCE 1990 71–72 (Greg N. Gregoriou & Luc Renneboog eds., Academic 
Press 2007) (“Functional convergence occurs when institutions are flexible enough to 
respond to demands by market participants and no formal change in the rules is 
necessary.  Formal convergence occurs when a change in the law forces the adoption of 
best practices.  Finally, contractual convergence occurs when firms change their own 
corporate governance practices by committing to a better regime, possibly because the 
legal system lacks flexibility or laws cannot be changed.”). 
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disclosure [in the context of] medical-based class action; financial 
services-based litigation” and others.65  But traditional, higher-profile risk 
assessments regarding DP are normally associated with cross-border 
transfers of that information or other activity with cross-border 
implications.
66
  These concerns are therefore heightened during any deals 
which touch upon multinational practice and especially those which rely 
upon new markets or customers for their strategic success.  Here, research 
on cross-border Deals confirms what logic suggests: “cross-border deals 
may present some unique opportunities but they also bring with them 
unique risks that may even offset the returns.”67 
 
[27] The increased connectivity brought by e-mail and electronic 
documents is not the only force spreading data transfers and their 
implicated DP.  Further prospective changes in information sharing and 
business operations occur as organizations modify traditional practices and 
incorporate new technologies, social media, the cloud, and bring-your-
own-device (“BYOD”) policies.  There are no exceptions; every 
organization wrestles with some connectivity issue, and some are even 
reverting to earlier data management modes, such as those organizations 
operating in geographies forbidding employee communication monitoring, 
and where BYOD pioneers rescind policies and remove employee options 
to select their own computing devices.
68
 
                                                                                                                                    
64
 See generally PETER P. SWIRE & KENESA AHMAD, U.S. PRIVATE-SECTOR PRIVACY: 
LAW AND PRACTICE FOR INFORMATION PRIVACY PROFESSIONALS 16, 21 (International 
Association of Privacy Professionals 2012) (noting that while there are no general federal 
standards regarding public privacy notices, sector-specific statutes such as HIPAA, 
Gramm-Leach-Bliley, and COPPA do impose such requirements). 
 
65
 Jeffrey Ritter, Webcast: Tips to Identify and Alleviate Hidden e-Discovery Costs, 
TECHTARGET SEARCHCOMPLIANCE (Aug. 27, 2013), 
http://searchcompliance.techtarget.com/video/Webcast-Tips-to-identify-and-alleviate-
hidden-e-discovery-costs, archived at http://perma.cc/63QG-GYVW. 
 
66
 See SWIRE & AHMAD, supra note 64, at 24. 
 
67
 See GAUGHAN, supra note 31, at 554. 
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[28] Most scholarship has focused on the concept of DP as it developed 
through European standards.  There is also a substantial overlap between 
international e-Discovery issues and their intersection with foreign data 
protection and privacy laws, recognized as a significant e-Discovery 
trend.
69
  Some cross-border Deals already incorporate DP into initial due 
diligence, as seen in late 2013 when a sale was abandoned after a 
Canadian Acquirer scuttled a deal where the U.S.-based asset was 
unusable due to DP concerns.
70
  That very risk analysis for DP issues is 
currently being decided by U.S. judges influenced by U.S. practitioners, 
and weighs heavily on the e-Discovery issues where “[p]rivacy and 
personal information that is the target of privacy regulation is increasingly 
influencing how e-[D]iscovery is conducted.”71 
 
 
                                                                                                                                    
68
 See Richard Walters, Bringing IT out of the Shadows, 2013 NETWORK SECURITY 5, 8 
(2013). 
 
69
 See, e.g., EXTERRO INC., FIVES STEPS TO AVOID COMMON LEGAL HOLD MISTAKES 4, 
available at http://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/five-steps-to-overcoming-common-legal-
ho-40170/, archived at http://perma.cc/3QKG-QUCS (citing BROWN ET AL., 2012 YEAR-
END ELECTRONIC DISCOVERY AND INFORMATION LAW UPDATE: MOVING BEYOND 
SANCTIONS AND TOWARD SOLUTIONS TO DIFFICULT PROBLEMS 2 (GIBSON, DUNN & 
CRUTCHER LLP 2013), available at 
http://www.gibsondunn.com/publications/pages/2012-YearEnd-Electronic-Discovery-
Update.aspx, archived at http://perma.cc/RX3Q-QREP). 
 
70
 See Texas Attorney General’s Objection [to Protect Consumer Privacy] to the Trustee’s 
Motion to Approve Sale Under 11 U.S.C. § 363(b)(1) at 1, 12–13, In re True Beginnings, 
LLC (E.D. Tex. Oct. 9, 2013) (No. 12-42061), available at 
https://www.texasattorneygeneral.gov/newspubs/releases/2013/True_Beginnings_objecti
on_to_sale.pdf, archived at https://perma.cc/FJ9E-KWJ4; see also Jacob Gershman, 
Privacy Concerns Nix Sale of Online Dating Site, WALL ST. J. L. BLOG  (Oct. 23, 2013, 
5:48 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2013/10/23/privacy-concerns-nix-sale-of-online-
dating-site/ (Canadian-owned dating site PlentyOfFish “pulled the plug on its offer to buy 
a bankrupt American rival after Texas’s attorney general warned that the sale would 
expose millions of singles to privacy risks”), archived at http://perma.cc/AE22-MR6Q .   
 
71
 Ritter, supra note 65.  
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F.  Information Security 
 
[29] The transfer of data and associated DP concerns interrelate directly 
with the management of those documents’ access and storage, traditionally 
known as data or information security.  Here, the gradual evolution of IS 
has included passwords and encryption techniques associated with 
information, access rights, or physical security associated with the 
electronic assets.  When merged with DP concerns, this combination may 
incorporate practices “such as ‘tokenization,’ where sensitive data is 
replaced with unique identification symbols that cannot be mathematically 
reversed.”72 
 
[30] Diffuse locations of information result from instances of risky 
Bring Your Own Software (“BYOS”) policies as well as cloud data 
transfers, one-off operations, BYOD, productivity suites, social media, 
and shadow IT.
73
  All contribute to “vicarious liability and corporate 
reputation” concerns as well as additional concerns associated with hacker 
data breaches or even data breaches that begin with employees “using 
personal devices to access the corporate network, often without their 
employer’s permission.”74   
 
[31] There are breach response laws associated with data breach risks, 
as well as some abbreviated mention of requirements in case law.  But 
while the current body of law is limited regarding organizational testing of 
target methods and practices, at least one judge found that so-called 
                                                     
72
 Judith A. Selby & James A. Sherer, BakerHostetler, Information Governance—2013 in 
Review, DATA PRIVACY MONITOR (Dec. 27, 2013), 
http://www.dataprivacymonitor.com/online-privacy/information-governance-2013-in-
review/, archived at http://perma.cc/S5AP-TCX2. 
 
73
 See Walters, supra note 68, at 6–7. 
 
74
 Id. at 7 (citing Ellen Messmer, Mobile BYOD Users Want More Security, NETWORK 
WORLD (May 9, 2012), 
http://www.networkworld.com/article/2188364/smartphones/mobile-byod-users-want-
more-security.html, archived at http://perma.cc/R4HM-MN6H.). 
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Monday morning quarterbacking would certainly incorporate an after-the-
fact assessment of liability, looking to what technology was available at 
the time of the problem that might have prevented it.
75
 
 
[32] While Data Security concerns are only occasionally mentioned 
among many potential considerations within M&A practice, failures on 
the IS front to thoroughly evaluate the Target’s IT infrastructure are often 
included as causes of post-acquisition challenges, problems, issues, and 
obstacles.
76
  Commentators are explicit in their concerns, noting that IS 
should instead be the first part of the due diligence practice.
77
  This 
approach would incorporate both informal discussions with the Target’s 
management, which in turn incorporate the Target’s commitment and 
ability to perform its practices, as well as requests for any third-party 
reports or certifications of the Target’s practices.78 
 
[33] Despite the insistence that IS is a primary and key component of 
due diligence practices, it “may be the least studied of all corporate 
activities in pre-acquisition negotiations.”79  At least one study found that 
current due diligence practices provide information that may be “adequate 
for major decision-making regarding human resources, finance, general 
management, operations, marketing and manufacturing,” but that fewer 
than half of Deals incorporated full information on even basic software or 
voice and data communication systems.
80
  The reasoning behind this 
divide between practice and importance was not entirely clear.  It may be 
that information regarding Target IS/IT infrastructure is not made freely 
                                                     
75
 See, e.g., Robins, supra note 15, at 353. 
 
76
 See, e.g., Ahammad & Glaister, supra note 9, at 897. 
 
77
 See, e.g., Robins, supra note 15, at 350. 
 
78
 See id. 
 
79
 McKiernan & Merali, supra note 39, at 57. 
 
80
 Id.  
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available to the Acquirer, that collection efforts are infrequent due to a 
lack of time, priority, or representation at the deal table,
81
 that the right 
questions are not being asked at the right time, or Acquirers simply do not 
see the value in purchasing diligence services that address these issues. 
 
[34] These mysteries should be concerning.  Some 83% of enterprise IT 
managers report that employees procure cloud-based applications without 
the involvement of their IT departments.
82
  In smaller organizations, “70% 
of IT managers . . . discover[] instances of cloud-based services being 
used without prior consultation with the IT department”83 or other poor 
practices that increase business risk and operational costs.
84
   
 
[35] These issues occur regardless of employee intentions, and despite 
the fact that “four-fifths of employees knew that using unapproved IT 
could compromise the security posture” of their organization.85  It is 
therefore unlikely that any Target will have full compliance, and the 
limited instances of due diligence practices that have attempted to assess 
the Target’s “risks and ability to remediate issues”86 therefore fall short of 
an IS-specific solution. 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
81
 See id.  
 
82
 Walters, supra note 68, at 5. 
 
83
 Id. 
 
84
 See JUDAH ET AL., supra note 51, at 1. 
 
85
 Walters, supra note 68, at 5. 
 
86
 Mark Diamond, A Records Management Checklist for Mergers and Acquisitions: 
Information Governance Due Diligence Is Key to Avoiding Surprises, INSIDE COUNSEL 
(March 20, 2013), http://www.insidecounsel.com/2013/03/20/a-records-management-
checklist-for-mergers-and-acq, archived at http://perma.cc/HY79-KMQ8. 
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G.  E-Discovery 
  
[36] E-Discovery as a separate concept is a relatively recent 
development associated primarily with United States litigation practices; 
under current jurisprudence, litigation or the reasonable anticipation 
thereof
87
 within the U.S. and elsewhere prompts organizations to preserve 
and/or create entirely new stores of extraordinarily sensitive information—
often Electronically Stored Information (“ESI”)—and retain that 
information regardless of normal IG practices.
88
  E-Discovery is both 
expensive and risky, and commentators helpfully note that every 
organization faces some sort of e-Discovery challenge.
89
   
 
[37] In a Deal, not only do the stores of ESI created through the 
operation of e-Discovery practices often transfer from the Target to the 
Acquirer, the duty to properly issue and maintain legal holds may as well, 
                                                     
87
 See The Sedona Conference Commentary on Legal Holds: The Trigger & The Process, 
11 SEDONA CONF. J. 265, 267 (2010) (“[W]henever litigation is reasonably anticipated, 
threatened, or pending against an organization, that organization has a duty to undertake 
reasonable and good faith actions to preserve relevant and discoverable information and 
tangible evidence.  This duty arises at the point in time when litigation is reasonably 
anticipated whether the organization is the initiator or the target of litigation.  The duty to 
preserve requires a party to identify, locate, and maintain information and tangible 
evidence that is relevant to specific and identifiable litigation.  It typically arises from the 
common law duty to avoid spoliation of relevant evidence for use at trial and is not 
explicitly defined in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.”). 
 
88
 This “exception” is often mandatory in many RIM and IG policies.  See Vicki Miller 
Luoma, Computer Forensics and Electronic Discovery: The New Management 
Challenge, 25 COMPUTERS & SECURITY 91, 96 (2006) (When creating an “electronic 
document retention and deletion policy . . . [a]ny such policy must retain the flexibility to 
implement litigation holds by suspending routine document deletion” when litigation is 
imminent.). 
 
89
 See COHASSET ASSOCS., MER 2012 SURVEY: ELECTRONICALLY STORED INFORMATION 
(ESI)—LEGAL HOLDS & DISPOSITIONS 5 (2012), available at 
http://www.cohasset.com/getDownload.php?id=15, archived at http://perma.cc/4ZVE-
HKL8 (demonstrating how in one survey, 100% of large organizations were involved in a 
litigation hold “very broad in nature affecting a large amount of information”). 
Richmond Journal of Law & Technology                              Volume XXI, Issue 2 
 
24 
 
as legal holds can reach across the transaction, and even through 
bankruptcy.
90
 These concerns were evidenced in In re NTL, Inc.,
91
 where 
the court addressed a post-bankruptcy, securities class action that 
continued as a claim against one of the subsidiaries.
92
  Electronically 
stored documents were destroyed, and the court found that the e-
Discovery duty to preserve began with the former company, but ran to the 
successor, thereby rejecting the successor’s claim and imposing a number 
of sanctions—including fees, costs, and adverse jury instructions.93 
 
[38] Acquirers have also encountered third-party issues, where 
confirming the location of and subsequently securing e-Discovery related 
ESI (as well as other information) also implicates the Target’s law firms, 
service vendors, subsidiaries, and third-party repositories.
94
  In turn, these 
third-parties have become targets for corporate espionage and hacking, as 
ESI relevant to litigation “[i]s some of the most volatile information a 
company may control.  It is the evidence of their truth or their innocence 
or possibly liability.”95  These concerns further extend to data about the 
data, such as maintaining chain-of-custody documentation for litigation-
held materials, as well as maintaining the integrity of metadata associated 
with those materials.
96
 
                                                     
90
 See, e.g., ROBERT D. BROWNSTONE & TODD R. GREGORIAN, WRANGLING, LASSOING 
AND ROPING AT THE M&A CORRAL II (2008), available at 
http://www.fenwick.com/FenwickDocuments/VCE_Wrangling_Lassoing_Roping_M-
A_Corral.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/8222-QKEU. 
 
91
 See Gordon Partners v. Blumenthal (In re NTL, Inc. Sec. Litig.), 244 F.R.D. 179, 193 
(S.D.N.Y. 2007).  
 
92
 See id. at 181. 
 
93
 See BROWNSTONE & GREGORIAN, supra note 90, at II. 
 
94
 See Ritter, supra note 65. 
 
95
 Id. 
 
96
 See Anders O. Flaglien et al., Storage and Exchange Formats for Digital Evidence, 8 
DIGITAL INVESTIGATION 122, 122 (2011). 
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H.  Information Governance 
  
[39] The proper management of information—IG and Records and 
Information Management (“RIM”) activities associated with how 
information is managed generally according to the plans and strategies of 
the organization—is the glue that holds many of the other associated 
issues together.
97
  Gartner further incorporates the specification of 
decision rights and an accountability framework to direct the “valuation, 
creation, storage, use, archiving and deletion of information,”98 including 
“the processes, roles, standards and metrics that ensure the effective and 
efficient use of information to enable an organization to achieve its 
goals.”99  In the context of a fact finder judgment within the U.S., 
organizations “cannot wait until litigation happens to attempt to retrieve 
information or to create a plan.  That is a plan for disaster.  It would be 
like first deciding how to evacuate passengers once you hit the iceberg.  A 
safe plan involves preplanning and preparation.”100 
  
[40] While there are quite a few issues built into the concept of IG, for 
the most part, an organization may govern its information as it sees fit.  As 
recognized by the U.S. Supreme Court in dicta, IG policies are sometimes  
 
[C]reated in part to keep certain information from getting 
into the hands of others[—]including the Government, are 
common in business, . . .[and a manager may] instruct his 
employees to comply with a valid document retention 
                                                     
97
 See COHASSET ASSOCS., 2013 | 2014 INFORMATION GOVERNANCE BENCHMARKING 
SURVEY 14 (2014), available at 
http://investors.ironmountain.com/files/doc_downloads/IRM%20-
%20Benchmarking%20Survey.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/8222-QKEU. 
 
98
 CALDWELL, supra note 61, at 3.  
 
99
 JUDAH ET AL., supra note 51, at 11. 
 
100
 Luoma, supra note 88, at 96. 
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policy under ordinary circumstances.
101
   
 
There is some case law governing appropriate information governance 
practices
102
 which may include “duties they owed to third parties in 
connection with litigation.”103  But while there is wide latitude for an 
organization’s choice of policy, it must follow its IG policies or face 
attendant risk.
104
  Organizations with no policies face the greatest 
hurdles.
105
  Of course, an IG regime is more than a strategy.  With the 
advent of mindless ESI creation, organizations must also create adequate 
storage space, hardware, and software to ensure safe storage of necessary 
information for the requisite time periods and be able to retrieve those 
documents.
106
   
 
[41] These concerns are absolutely recognized in the M&A context, 
where related risks may exist as hidden liabilities within acquired 
companies.
107
 Without hyperbole, this risk exists everywhere: every 
                                                     
101
 Arthur Andersen LLP v. United States, 544 U.S. 696, 704 (2005). 
 
102
 See, e.g., Phillip M. Adams & Assocs. v. Dell, Inc., 621 F. Supp. 2d 1173, 1193 (D. 
Utah 2009); Gippetti v. UPS, No. C07-00812 RMW (HRL), 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
109613, at *9–12 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 6, 2008); Connor v. Sun Trust Bank, 546 F. Supp. 2d 
1360, 1376 (N.D. Ga. 2008); Kozlowski v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 73 F.R.D. 73, 76–77 
(D. Mass. 1976). 
 
103
 Philip J. Favro, Information Technology: Sea Change or Status Quo: Has the Rule 
37(e) Safe Harbor Advanced Best Practices for Records Management?, 11 MINN. J.L. 
SCI. & TECH. 317, 334 (2010). 
 
104
 See Doe v. Norwalk Cmty. Coll., 248 F.R.D. 372, 378 (D. Conn. 2007). 
 
105
 See, e.g., Technical Sales Assocs. v. Ohio Star Forge Co., No. 07-11745, 2009 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 22431, at *18, *22 (E.D. Mich. Mar. 19, 2009); Keithley v. Home 
Store.com, Inc., No. C-03-04447 SI (EDL), 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 61741, at *18–19, 
*47–49 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 12, 2008). 
 
106
 See Luoma, supra note 88, at 96. 
 
107
 See Diamond, supra note 86. 
Richmond Journal of Law & Technology                              Volume XXI, Issue 2 
 
27 
 
organization stores and manages data it does not need, and those 
organizations which have undertaken systematic analyses of existing data 
stores consistently indicate that “redundant, outdated, trivial and risky data 
represents between 15% and 60%” of the data they maintain.108 
 
[42] As mentioned above, there are direct costs associated with doing 
nothing.  These are also expensive costs, even if not immediately visible 
or straightforward.  While the purchase price of individual servers needed 
to store preserved data may not be impressive, “when associated expenses 
for network connections, maintenance, redundancy, development, 
security, and backup are factored in, all resources associated with a single 
terabyte of preserved data were said to cost in excess of $100,000.”109  
This can lead to absurd results, with one company reporting that “one-
third of its IT department’s e-mail resources were now dedicated to 
preserved information.”110 
 
[43] Data migration projects, which include M&A Deals and related 
transactions, are also recognized opportunities for legal and IT 
professionals to “eliminate redundant, outdated and trivial data, by up to 
60% in some cases, decreasing data management costs and reducing legal 
and regulatory risks.”111  In contrast, practitioners who fail to contemplate 
or address these types of IG issues may leave value on the table, where 
potential acquisition benefits might otherwise include “technological 
synergies through additions to the stock of the firm’s knowledge and 
transfer of that knowledge within the new combination.”112  This may be 
                                                     
108
 LOGAN ET AL., supra note 61, at 3.  
 
109
 PACE & ZAKARAS, supra note 53, at 88. 
 
110
 Id. 
 
111
 LOGAN ET AL., supra note 61, at 1.  
 
112
 James et al., supra note 21, at 565.  See generally FUMIO KODAMA, EMERGING 
PATTERNS OF INNOVATION: SOURCES OF JAPAN’S TECHNOLOGICAL EDGE (1991) (using 
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particularly significant if the transaction hinges on an incorporation of 
technology fusion or “innovations [that] require the bringing together of 
different knowledge bases rooted in different technological traditions.”113 
 
III.  WHY CURRENT DUE DILIGENCE PRACTICES SHOULD INCORPORATE 
DP, IS, E-DISCOVERY, AND IG ANALYSIS 
 
A.  Silos May Obscure Logical Efficiencies 
 
[44] Deals are “dominated by financial and business managers”114 who 
simply cannot perform their functions while also developing expertise in a 
number of other discrete areas.  This specialization has developed silos of 
expertise focused on specific areas,
115
 leading to the type of analysis 
where outside systems analysts look at hardware/software compatibility 
while the legal and audit functions focus on organizational documentation, 
contingent liabilities, and existing/potential internal and external 
hazards.
116
  Those silos also exist within both the Target and the Acquirer, 
where even the related functions of IG and IS traditionally operate in 
separate silos, impeding practitioners’ abilities to reduce information risk; 
cut the cost associated with information management; and realize the 
                                                                                                                                    
time.  In analyzing data gathered over ten years of intensive research and study of 
Japanese firms, Fumio distinguishes six dimensions along which the shift is occurring: 
manufacturing, business diversification, R&D competition, product development, 
innovation pattern, and societal diffusion of technology). 
 
113
 James et al., supra note 21, at 565. 
 
114
 Id. at 566. 
 
115
 See, e.g., James McLetchie, Next-generation Integration Management Office: A 
McKinsey Perspective on Organizing Integrations to Create Value, in PROSPECTIVES ON 
MERGER INTEGRATION 31, 31 (2010), available at 
http://www.mckinsey.com/client_service/organization/latest_thinking/mm_compendium-
new, archived at http://perma.cc/7P5J-2NR3.  
 
116
 See, e.g., Harvey & Lusch, supra note 32, at 11 (exhibiting the due diligence auditing 
process).  
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inherent value of information assets.
117
 
 
[45] The very operation of a perfect silos-within-silos environment 
makes cross-function cooperation practically impossible, and even the 
exchange of information becomes difficult.  Silos prevent the creation of a 
singular picture of the environment, and logical links between and among 
departments remain unconsidered.  Prior to the advent of recent data 
growth trends, this was inefficient.
118
  Now, with the continued evolution 
of legal practices, technological advances, a changing regulatory 
environment, and cross-border DP and IS issues, it exponentially 
decreases value while increasing risk.  These intertwined issues may also 
impact the success of the Deal, dependent as it is on integration issues and 
related personnel concerns on both the Acquirer and Target sides that are 
central to consequent performance.
119
 
 
B.  IT and Related Integration May Impact Merger Success 
  
[46] Dealmakers contemplate that “[i]f an inefficient firm merges with 
one that is more efficient and adopts the behavior of the lower-cost firm, 
we would expect to see post-merger costs lower than pre-merger costs, 
irrespective of economies of scale.”120  But success in these areas requires 
“the definition of the new corporate information systems (IS), 
infrastructure requirements, the high cost of integration and development 
of information technology (IT) systems and a reluctance to define both IS 
and IT in the ex-ante stage.”121  A better definition of Technology or IT 
                                                     
117
 See TED FRIEDMAN & TOM SCHOLTZ, ALIGN INFORMATION SECURITY GOVERNANCE 
WITH YOUR BROADER INFORMATION GOVERNANCE INITIATIVES 1 (2013), available at 
https://www.gartner.com/doc/2576217/align-information-security-governance-broader, 
archived at https://perma.cc/KR28-B7MS.  
 
118
 See, e.g., Robins, supra note 15, at 321–23. 
 
119
 See e.g., McKiernan & Merali, supra note 39, at 55. 
 
120
 Engberg et al., supra note 24, at 576.  
 
121
 McKiernan & Merali, supra note 39, at 55. 
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therefore incorporates “a spectrum which at one end consists of the 
established products and manufacturing processes of the firm and at the 
other end the ability of the firm to develop new knowledge.”122  And when 
dealing with a spectrum-type issue, there is no magic to the concept that 
asking the right type and volume of questions leads to a better result.
123
 
 
[47] Technological interactions with the practices of an organization are 
complex concerns that require more than quantitative information—they 
require qualitative information as well.
124
  That is, a deluge of information 
without structure or context is not as useful for real cost determinations.
125
  
And when that structure or context is not addressed during the deal or 
immediately after, it simply goes away.  Knowledge-generating routines 
and other ad hoc practices are not only likely to be fragile.  Linkages with 
external (and indeed internal) sources of technological knowledge may 
also be informal and often specific to individuals.
126
  There, the link 
between context and value is lost; without advance planning, the link 
between context and increased risk may also compound problems in the 
areas of regulatory compliance and legal holds “in that target’s transaction 
counsel tends to disappear once the deal is consummated.”127 
 
[48] It is questionable whether these issues are addressed at a rate the 
costs and risk associated with them demand.  As presented in a recent 
study, the hardware and software aspects of the systems of the 
management information system (“MIS”) function were the “least studied 
of all corporate functions in premerger/acquisition due diligence.  In 
                                                     
122
 James et al., supra note 21, at 564. 
 
123
 See, e.g., id.  
 
124
 See, e.g., HARTLEY, supra note 23, at 209. 
 
125
 See, e.g., JUDAH ET AL., supra note 51, at 3. 
 
126
 See, e.g., James et al., supra note 21, at 567. 
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addition, MIS issues were the lowest priority when merging activities 
during the post-merger.”128  Despite this lack of responsibility and 
interaction during the due diligence stage, IT professionals are often 
expected to “manage the post-acquisition combination of the technological 
assets of acquirer and the acquired business having had little input into the 
research and planning of the acquisition and the design of the post-
acquisition management strategy.”129 
 
[49] Some of these activities are immediately realized, as a number of 
estimates provide that some  
 
70% of merged companies combine IS operations 
immediately after the merger transaction takes place, whilst 
up to 90% eventually combine IS operations into a single 
data centre, usually within a year.  IS/IT is likely to have a 
reactive role, in that it must be integrated to consolidate 
other operations.
130
   
 
Finally, for each of these activities, ad hoc IS merging activities are even 
more haphazard, as acquisition-related activities—at least for most 
internal (and many external) parties—are by their nature non-routine 
processes that each require a tailored, expert approach.
131
 
 
C.  Traditional Practice is Challenged by Complex 
Technological Interrelations 
 
[50] Present-and-future organizations built on innovation and new 
                                                     
128
 Harvey & Lusch, supra note 32, at 15; see also Norbert Kubilus, The Systems 
Manager’s Role in Mergers and Acquisitions, FINANCIAL AND ACCOUNTING SYSTEMS 15 
(1990). 
 
129
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technologies present challenges where intangible knowledge assets are 
extremely difficult to evaluate.
132
  Articles discussing the acquisition of 
technologies also acknowledge that those types of acquisitions involve far 
more than simply transferring ownership of physical assets and codified 
technical information.  Successful acquisitions also depend on the context 
of the Target’s unique capabilities, values, and styles, and the tacit nature 
of capabilities and the routines that underpin them.  Consideration of these 
factors often leads to difficulties under “the pressures of acquisition 
decision making to come up with quantifiable answers.”133 
  
[51] Instead of one-off or infrequent concerns, these are issues in every 
Deal, where every transaction of substance (those requiring due diligence) 
will also incorporate: 
 
 The transfer of assets from one party to another or the creation 
of obligations;  
 The existence of risks that may affect the future value of such 
assets or obligations; and 
 The need to apportion the risks between the parties134 
 
D.  Traditional Practice is Challenged by Complex Legal Issues 
and Technological Interrelations 
 
[52] Here, too, the legal framework surrounding and infusing the 
traditional due diligence Deal has evolved in complexity such that no 
individual has sufficient expertise to address all the issues.
135
  Traditional 
practice involves, for example, “legal teams . . . of more than a dozen 
attorneys, each bringing specialized expertise in a given aspect of the law 
such as M&As, corporate, tax, employee benefits, real estate, antitrust, 
                                                     
132
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133
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securities, environmental, and intellectual property.”136  There are already 
provisions for litigation experts, and this role is beginning to expand to 
incorporate the information-related issues to help better position a Target 
for acquisition.
137
 
 
[53] Even though these deals present a complex environment on both 
the technology and legal sides, legal professionals are currently left with 
specific issue spotting, rather than a strategic consideration of the whole.  
These traditional issues include: 
 
 Basic organizational matters;  
 Ownership of securities;  
 Banks and borrowing;  
 Financial history;  
 Litigation;  
 General regulatory data;  
 Real property;  
 Personal property;  
 Intellectual property rights;  
 Contractual management issues;  
 Labor contracts and history; and 
 Insurance138 
 
Further, a “vast majority of the audit is verification of the existence of 
material elements of the business” and, in addition, where practitioners are 
asked to provide opinions (legal and otherwise) “to the acquiring company 
and its leaders on liabilities or contingent liabilities.”139 
 
                                                     
136
 Id.  
 
137
 See id. 
 
138
 See Harvey & Lusch, supra note 32, at 12.  
 
139
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[54] Despite findings that Legal is also considered a core component of 
integration projects common to organizations,
140
 this is a problem with 
two uncommunicative sides: business people may not know what value 
attorney assistance may provide on these topics, and attorneys may be 
unaware of decisions that are made in this process until it is too late.  This 
is true even in the United States, where, despite its history of leading the 
way in due diligence developments, due diligence is not yet a recognized 
focus in the educational community; is not treated as a separate discipline 
in law schools; and within the business education community, “only 
covered within the accounting world, typically integrated as an audit 
topic.”141  But for those in the know, the specialists who understand these 
issues are valued and add value, as “boutique advisors spend more time, 
probably on due diligence and negotiation, to complete deals . . . [leading 
to] findings [which] suggest that boutique advisors are chosen in more 
complex deals and they achieve more favorable deal outcomes.”142 
 
[55] This lack of consideration does not consider true costs prior to the 
deal, leading to a variety of results planted on different points along the 
Deal diligence spectrum, where some Deals completely ignore or 
shortchange; others pay lip service or incorporate some findings; and 
others consider them separately and conjointly.  In the first instance, 
where neither the Target nor the Acquirer takes any action, not only are 
issues missed, but the risk actually increases over time and post-Deal. 
 
[56] Information, while sometimes seen as an insurmountable 
challenge, is also ephemeral; both the data
143
 and the context surrounding 
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it degrade.  The second situation is admittedly better, where some action is 
taken by the Target, the Acquirer, or both.  This decreases or shifts the 
risk; however, decisions made in one area inevitably affect other areas of 
the overall deal structure, and attempting to contain the risk “associated 
with a complex deal is analogous to catching a water balloon. Squeezing 
one end of the balloon simply forces the contents to shift elsewhere.”144  
Here, efforts are likely more of a stop-gap rather than total improvement, 
but some improvement is vastly better than none at all. 
 
[57] In the third instance, full action is only taken after the fact by the 
Acquirer; that is, rather than developing these ideas during the due 
diligence practice, the Acquirer assumes it will happen in-house after the 
deal is done.  First, and contrary to some public belief,
145
 information 
storage is expensive,
146
 with significant attendant time and budgetary 
commitments.
147
  If the Acquirer considers the Target asset-by-asset and 
does not include the existing IT budget as part of its analysis, these costs 
may not be factored into the Deal price. 
 
[58] Of course, once the Acquirer decides that it must deal with the 
acquired information (we argue properly part of the Deal), the effort to 
properly manage that information costs time and money, which cannot be 
recouped at that point post-transaction.  This lack of consideration also 
loses the benefits potentially gained in these activities, where prior 
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 See e.g., Bit Rot, THE ECONOMIST (Apr. 28, 2012), 
http://www.economist.com/node/21553445, archived at http://perma.cc/JGR8-DH2Z.  
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knowledge and experience contributes to a fuller prospective picture and 
better results
148
 and can lead to direct cost savings
149
 rather than additional 
realized costs post-Deal close. 
 
[59] There are further costs associated with redundancy in the process; 
avoiding that issue requires addressing overlapping and redundant efforts 
by bringing IG projects in the areas of privacy and data security together 
during integration.
150
  A lack of consideration also results in the loss of 
protections that are available through the courts, where the practices 
would otherwise need to demonstrate that the participants took actions in 
good faith, living up to the standard that “a presumption that in making a 
business decision the directors of a corporation acted on an informed 
basis, in good faith and in the honest belief that the action taken was in the 
best interests of the company.”151  The issue in turn recognizes the issue 
associated with attorneys leaving with valuable knowledge, where of 
course extensive post-merger integration (if attempted) will often be a 
difficult and time-consuming task. 
 
[60] Attorney involvement is expected to incorporate that action into a 
negotiated Target price, where “this investment in resource and time 
[would] be used to counter inflated premiums for the target firm.”152  The 
attorney and expert involvement provides shareholder value return, and 
may provide further assistance in assessing how viable the Deal results 
will actually be.  “In-house lawyers are often key players in determining 
                                                     
148
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the strategy and implementation of acquisitions and so it is important that 
they can provide guidance to their colleagues on the importance of 
effective integration.”153  Further, some work is being done on these issues 
in the bankruptcy context.
154
  But there has not been a presented 
framework outlining these four issues (plus information concerning the 
Deal itself) in a cohesive practice. 
 
IV.  A PROPOSAL TO IMPROVE M&A DUE DILIGENCE IN APPROPRIATE 
CIRCUMSTANCES 
 
[61] The proper combination of these concerns will enable due 
diligence practitioners to realize the exact type of scale economies
155
 that 
normal M&A practice attempts to provide by the very deal itself.  It is no 
secret that an appropriate consideration of Target records and other forms 
of information add major insights to M&A decisions.
156
  This framework 
will incorporate related analyses of interrelated advances in technology in 
practice that ultimately may affect the bottom line of the Acquirer. 
  
[62] The concept is straightforward: a modified due diligence practice 
                                                     
153
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built from traditional efforts, which have already begun  to address IT 
practices (albeit slowly and imperfectly), licensing procedures, and the 
costs and activities associated with the management of IT assets and 
information.  The DDT will work with each subject matter expert 
(“SME”) with a slate of additional questions—both focused and 
unfocused.  These additional questions will, in large part, simply add to 
questions already asked and meetings already arranged.  In even those 
instances where the correct people are not in the room, or the DDT has not 
asked for a particular schedule, policy, or explanation, these additional 
questions and even lack of answers will help to give a clearer picture of 
post-Deal reality. 
 
[63] It is time to acknowledge and reap the benefits from addressing 
these issues in the context of the Deal, despite the history, which fails in 
large part to acknowledge them outside of well-defined areas.  Fixing 
issues ex post facto is a dubious solution, where Deals provide a strong 
internal momentum that sweeps aside “all but the most obvious of post-
merger integration considerations.”157  To best position an Acquirer for 
proper and beneficial good corporate governance and related practices—
and to maximize post-merger value through realistic purchase prices, these 
aspects should be prioritized before, rather than after, the Deal.
158
  Just as 
lawyers are now encouraged to import the Business Judgment Rule 
(“BJR”) into preservation,159 corporate Deal makers may acknowledge 
what happens on the other side of the fence. 
 
[64] The principles for diligence in a Deal fit into the paradigm of 
Master Data Management (“MDM”), a technology-enabled business 
discipline in which business and IT cooperate to provide “uniformity, 
accuracy, stewardship, semantic consistency and accountability for an 
enterprise’s official, shared master data assets.”160  The overall framework 
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relies first on a commitment to incorporating the three essential elements 
of the BJR: 
 
 Using an independent or audit-type decision maker without a 
personal interest in the outcome to assess the accuracy of 
representations made by IT professionals, RIM personnel, and 
other interested parties;  
 Arming the independent decision maker with the necessary 
facts to make a reasonable judgment; and 
 Making a judgment on the basis of the best interests of the 
business.
161
 
 
In the context of the Deal, this focus is on the assets and issues the 
Acquirer will inherit, and what it will take to successfully manage both.  
With this in mind, each area covered will focus first on the correct Target 
personnel to query, the appropriate questions to ask, and the manner in 
which the due diligence practitioner will memorialize the results. 
 
[65] Managing information assets works most successfully when 
addressing interrelated DP, IS, e-Discovery, and IG issues in concert.  
Legal concerns are already part of traditional due diligence practices, 
where practitioners examine and analyze the existing liabilities and 
ongoing litigation of the Target.  An evolution of the practice would also 
incorporate prospective litigation—information preserved by legal 
regarding litigation (ongoing and prospective).  Examining the 
information associated with the Target’s liabilities and litigation may lead 
into a broader examination of the Target’s IG, as well as fomenting 
inquiries into how the Target manages information on personnel, policy, 
and technical issues.  Questions would also include whether there is 
information kept on specific servers for a specific purpose, the origin and 
reasons of which will be lost once the migration is complete.  These 
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inquiries round out the data locations, types, and volumes as well as the 
current status of each. 
 
[66] The inquiries into these issues, and information management 
generally (both legal and otherwise) may consider near-in-time restrictions 
associated with data management and data transfer.  For IS issues, the 
diligence may question how the Acquirer will be able to access data with 
passwords, data stores with limited access rights, data use prescribed by 
statute, or even data associated with IS documentation and monitoring 
efforts.  These inquiries may also incorporate questions regarding how any 
data migration will impact the business continuity procedures of the 
Acquirer.
162
 
 
[67] Finally, the diligence will ascertain and evaluate existing DP 
concerns (and documentation about the way in which they were dealt 
with) to determine just how much of the existing infrastructure and 
practices can intelligibly be drawn into the new organization.  In this 
context, the locations of where information was kept by the Target, why it 
is kept there, how the function is integrated within the Target, and even 
the cultural features of the Target’s location(s) will impact the results of 
the diligence—and may affect the ultimate outcome of the deal.163 
 
[68] A proposed framework that addresses DP, IS, e-Discovery, and IG 
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begins with finding the right people within the Target to query.  As an 
added benefit, the diligence also determines if the correct people are not 
there, a not unusual occurrence, as critical people often leave before an 
acquisition or asset purchase is finalized.  Moreover, some roles go 
unfilled, and some roles are never even recognized as assignable 
responsibilities.  Once the individuals are identified, instead of paralyzing 
the process with too much detail, the focus of the inquiry then incorporates 
simple, strategic questions, such as: 
 
 What is the most critical business information the Target, your 
group, and you maintain? 
 What information is shared across business processes on an 
enterprise wide basis? 
 Where is the documentation underlying our intellectual 
property?
164
  
 What can we let go?165 
 
These questions may lead to the construction of a data map—a focus for 
further determinations as to what steps the Acquirer needs to take and at 
what times—rather than a more time consuming and expensive wish list.  
A workable framework might also include the search for and evaluation of 
other intangible assets, including: 
 
 Intellectual property; 
 Trade secrets; 
 Contracts and licenses; 
 Structured databases; 
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 Structured personnel groupings and organizational networks; 
 Existing organizational culture; and  
 The “know-how” of employees and managers.166 
 
This framework considers the use of service provider analysis to bid 
effectively on projects prior to their performance post-merger.  The 
partnership between the due diligence practitioner, often an attorney or 
attorney-led team, and the service provider which, in effect, bids on the 
post-Deal work, is key to much of this framework’s potential success.  As 
discussed in greater detail below, the service provider is incentivized to 
provide a realistic pricing structure to implement the work envisioned in 
the diligence process, as an ideal service provider partner wants to perform 
the post-Deal work and might not risk being underbid for that opportunity.  
In fact, in instances where there is a great deal of post-Deal work, each 
member of the DDT should examine those issues with which she has the 
most knowledge, a self-taught insider perspective into the deal where she 
knows best what the post-Deal work will cost. 
 
[69] Finally, the framework also includes references to the timing of the 
post-Deal integration, understanding that a less than timely integration 
lowers the realized value from the transaction.
167
  Further, from the 
perspective of the Acquirer, and according to the problem of compound 
interest, decisions made at the point of the deal will only be magnified 
over time,
168
 as present-day decisions subject to the incredible growth of 
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data will have exponential effects going forward. 
 
V.  THE DP, IS, E-DISCOVERY, AND IG FRAMEWORK 
 
A.  Data Privacy 
 
[70] Many organizations have a Data Protection Officer that handles 
inquiries related to regulations the Target is subjected to, as well as the 
implications of new technologies and other unique queries.
169
  An 
appraisal of this operation will be telling, as the level of sophistication 
may vary dramatically.  The DDT should not expect to find exhaustive, 
documented policies and procedures covering the DP waterfront within 
the Target; as not all companies have sophisticated DP policies and 
procedures and some “organizations do a terrible job of using and securing 
data.”170  Insight here will be helpful to the DDT in comparing-and-
contrasting DP information with what the legal and IG interviews provide, 
rounding out articulated data sources and stores, and determining what 
concerns the Target evidenced during its prior operations. 
 
[71] Regardless of the existing structure, and as with Data Security, the 
Data Privacy analysis is less about identifying specific information stores, 
and is more focused on what to do about those stores.  This portion of the 
analysis starts with some basic questions (such as whether the Target is 
Safe Harbor Certified) and then moves into the more holistic evaluation of 
the Target’s practices through the lens of the generally well-established 
principles of data protection that include the following: 
 
 The initial data collection of protected data (both by the Target 
and subsequently by the Acquirer) should be limited; 
                                                     
169
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 The collected data should be relevant to the reasons for its 
collection; 
 The collected data and the stated reasons for its collection and 
use should be accurate; 
 The data should be processed lawfully and in accordance with 
the data subject’s rights; 
 The data protection measures should be adequate and the data 
kept secure; 
 The data should be used for limited purposes; 
 The data should not be kept longer than necessary;171 and 
 The data should “not [be] transferred to countries without 
adequate protection”.172 
 
In addition to the lawful reasons indicated above for data privacy 
concerns, the due diligence process and the incorporation of these issues 
post-Deal are important for “local historical and cultural norms . . . [which 
provide] significant social pressures to conform to local forms of 
rationality,”173 and may provide some additional benefits to a U.S. based 
Acquirer when acquiring a foreign Target.  That is, an additional benefit of 
providing some due diligence impact is the importance shown to the 
people interviewed and eventually impacted (i.e., ‘we the Acquirer value 
your privacy rights and this transition will be less impactful than it could 
have been otherwise’). 
 
[72] The protection of data subject to DP concerns includes an analysis 
of the specific devices and processes that the Target uses to maintain 
security where the DDT examination might make special care to focus on 
the security afforded to customer or employee personal information, as 
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 See SPEDDING, supra note 27, at 310. 
 
172
 Id. at 310. 
 
173
 Angwin, supra note 28, at 37 (citing Paul J. DiMaggio & Walter W. Powell, The Iron 
Cage Revisited: Institutional Isomorphism and Collective Rationality in Organizational 
Fields, 48 AM. SOC. REV. 147, 147–48 (1983)). 
Richmond Journal of Law & Technology                              Volume XXI, Issue 2 
 
45 
 
well as PII.
174
  This will also incorporate other questions into the technical 
measures the Target may use for its DP practices, including privacy 
management tools that may help “conduct privacy impact assessments, 
check processing activities against requirements from privacy regulations, 
and track incidents that lead to unauthorized disclosures (investigation, 
remediation and reporting).”175   
 
[73] Those tools may also “analyze and document data flows of 
personal information (nature of data, purpose of processing, data 
controller), support authoring and distribution of privacy policies (for 
which they provide templates), and track user awareness (users 
acknowledging having read the policies).”176  Of note here is the circular 
nature of the DDT practice: each of these types of DP technical measures 
may incorporate data stores the Acquirer may have to integrate or 
remediate, such as logs of consents, acknowledgements, or data collection 
purposes. 
 
[74] Additional layers of DP analysis will incorporate the jurisdictions 
at play in the Deal, and an appreciation for—if not an investigation into—
the jurisdictions’ data privacy required practices, some of which are 
directly incorporated into the regulations themselves.
177
  This is especially 
true in cross-border or multinational Deals, where the DDT might ask the 
Deal strategists questions about the Deal’s purpose and eventual shape 
(e.g., whether the market is to be treated as homogeneous, or whether 
customer requirements differ between countries).
178
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B.  Information Security 
 
[75] As with other categories of analysis, determining the impact 
information security may have on the Deal and post-Deal integration 
begins with finding the right personnel to interview and the right materials 
to review.  At least here, the IT component is ingrained enough in 
common practice that, unlike many instances of IG or DP, it is likely that 
there will be at least one person, if not an entire department, dedicated to 
supporting the IT function.  Within that group, based in part on the normal 
operation of the IT systems themselves, there is a natural determination of 
permissions to particular information sets or resources.  These are often 
documented, and the DDT may compile copies to both determine the costs 
associated with and to actually assist with the actual activities surrounding 
post-Deal migration and harmonization activity. 
 
[76] The questions to ask the IS representative(s) will focus on the 
Target’s memorialization of security levels and associated “accountability 
and decisions rights,” any decisions the Target has made when deciding 
“between conflicting security requirements and risk affinities;” and the 
manner in which IS has been keeping the Target’s executives and 
stakeholders appraised of Target’s information risk management 
practices.
179
   
 
[77] Some of the issues the DDT will uncover when involving IT are 
novel in the due diligence space, where, as indicated above, although most 
Acquirers acknowledge the role of IT in post-Deal business strategy, few 
consider IS/IT integration requirements.
180
  These issues, however, will be 
similar to the issues raised during the DP investigation; for example: 
questions focused on how the organization developed existing policies; 
how they operate on the information; and where critical information (e.g., 
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passwords, security functions, and other access mechanisms) resides. 
 
[78] An additional step exists within the IS space, where access rights 
and documentation thereof may not even focus on a defined location or set 
of captured information.  Modern IS practices also incorporate “access 
management and auditing of web-based applications that are equivalent to 
traditional on premise application management policies” that seek to gain 
“the productivity benefits of the cloud.”181  A common refrain within DDT 
IS interviews is often, “what else do you manage?,” as IS professionals are 
also commonly tasked with supporting compliance efforts “by detecting 
and preventing insider misuse of applications—whether inadvertent, such 
as sharing log-in details with colleagues, or intentional, such as copying or 
forwarding sensitive financial details or customer lists.”182 
 
[79] The DDT IS inquiry focuses on three temporal components: 
 
1. The past, documented processes within IS that, even if retired, 
may shine light on “dark” or “dusty” data sources uncovered as 
virtual unknowns within the IG due diligence component—and 
will, of course, indicate further information regarding the 
Target’s maturity model score. 
2. Present-day practices, key to what the Acquirer is purchasing, 
give even more validity to the maturity model score. 
3. The IS inquiry will also focus on the core components of future 
integration projects for IT and systems—that is, the transfer of 
data to the Acquirer and its harmonization with new standards, 
as well as a continuation of the appropriate security protocols 
and protections, which may include distribution lists and access 
to files and systems.
183
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DDT inquiries can incorporate additional levels of detail and involve 
checklists listing various types of integrated technological systems.  These 
include transaction controls monitoring (“TCM”) technology, which 
integrates governance, risk, and compliance issues and monitors enterprise 
resource planning (“ERP”) and financial application transaction controls 
which improve financial governance and automate audit processes.  TCM 
software may also help identify exceptions to policies, business rules, and 
built-in application controls.
184
 
 
[80] The DDT will also inquire into auto-delete type functions, as 
nearly all organizations enable automatic software processes that delete 
sent or received e-mail after a certain set time.
185
  The DDT will use this 
opportunity to confirm that the IS understanding is operationally the same 
as IG and legal (and that incorrect understandings of these automatic 
operations will not derail strategic decisions made regarding legal hold 
and IG).  Further, the DDT will inquire into the IS perspective on legal 
holds, where IS may be aware of orphan data stores or tasks which were 
delegated to IS or IT without effective Target sign-off, as in many cases, 
Target’s legal department will have instituted a legal hold, but never 
rescinded it, even if the matter is no longer ongoing.
186
  Data Maps are 
often key components of IS practice associated with these efforts which 
may implicate, among other issues, legal holds.
187
 
 
[81] IS professionals interviewed by the DDT might be encouraged to 
give their own perspectives on what the costs associated with an ex ante 
evaluation of what the acquired organization’s IS/IT infrastructure would 
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be.
188
  As with IG professionals knowing where the “bodies are buried,” 
the IS interview may raise issues where expedient work-arounds were 
employed that will have to be dealt with by the Acquirer, with or without 
the assistance of the former Target employees.  These are critical 
concerns, which despite being “often cited as major reason[s] why IS/IT 
systems contribute to ex-poste problems,” have been long underserved, as 
“it would appear that the ex-ante due-diligence process rarely includes a 
thorough evaluation of the IS/IT infrastructure” which may be further 
complicated by the difficulty associated with evaluating IS and most 
companies’ obliviousness regarding “the total value of their investment in 
IS/IT, including the value of software and data.”189 
 
C.  E-Discovery 
 
[82] The DDT inquiries begin with the recognition that legal hold best 
practices recommend creating “Information Management Team[s],” which 
include experts in computer forensics, law, information management, IT, 
and auditing.
190
  Regardless of whether the Target has a well-defined 
team, the DDT might address each of these issues in turn, asking such 
questions as: 
 
 Are legal holds implemented with forensic collection? 
 Who traditionally directed the implementation of legal holds 
and answered any questions? 
 Where is the legal hold data stored? 
 Who is responsible? 
 
[83] A good place to start is with litigators, as a vast majority (82%) of 
legal holds are overseen by in-house legal teams.
191
  But 82% does not 
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equal 100%, and e-Discovery efforts are sometimes a part-time duty 
assigned to a variety of employees.
192
  Here, too, best practices and court 
requirements may require guidance, supervision, and audits where the 
Target has held the “hands of their employees and other custodians—both 
internally and externally—in navigating the complexity of e-Discovery 
and making sure everybody knows what they need to know.”193  DDT 
questions regarding the Target’s Legal Hold policy will lead to issued 
instances of the policy, as well as the people subject to the policy. 
 
[84] There may be technological solutions in play, but the “majority of 
litigation holds are still managed and tracked manually.”194  In fact, more 
than half of litigation holds are tracked by manual or written processes; 
only one third use an automated software tool (including commercial e-
Discovery tools or custom software); and five percent still rely on verbal 
legal holds.
195
  Legal holds may be broader than responding to an existing 
or threatened lawsuit, as the DDT must also inquire as to information 
retained for regulatory compliance purposes,
196
 as such requirements may 
travel with the Deal and become the responsibility of the Acquirer.
197
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[85] The DDT may also acknowledge and recognize the overlapping 
nature of legal holds, which is not a one-custodian-to-one hold issue.  
Instead, the retention of legal hold material involves a complex interplay 
that will take some effort to untangle, where Targets routinely involved in 
multiple legal actions may face rolling litigation holds, “in which 
collections of documents and ESI are preserved for litigation, overlapping 
with subsequent litigation and with litigation to come. Since the scope of 
the duty of preservation includes ‘reasonably anticipated’ litigation as well 
as filed actions, caches of data may be under one or more litigation holds 
interminably.”198 
 
[86] A beginning point for this complex interplay of legal holds is to 
develop a basic data map, where the Target explains the company’s 
litigation profile (e.g., why it sues and gets sued) and then provides an 
existing—or assists the DDT with building out—a high-level data map 
broadly focused on the sources that house the documents and data that 
relate to those types of disputes.
199
  The DDT cannot rely entirely on 
existing component pieces from the Target to compile even a high-level 
data map, as at least one study indicates that approximately a third of 
organizations do not track legal holds at all while “another third relied on 
rudimentary spreadsheets.”200  A DDT effort in this area therefore might 
seek relevant information, but may end up basing the entirety of its 
analysis on personal interviews and extrapolations from existing sources. 
 
D.  Information Governance 
 
[87] IG issues are already listed on some recent due diligence 
questionnaires, which incorporate advice to “learn the location of all 
documents” and satisfy the Acquirer that the Target “has retained adequate 
records” which satisfy federal, state, and the internal policies of the 
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Target.
201
  DDT inquiries into IG which incorporate that standard as well 
as other considerations might start by identifying any defined, existing IG 
group within the Target.  However, much of the knowledge regarding the 
nuts-and-bolts of the Target’s practice and experience likely resides with 
the Target’s Corporate Records Manager (“CRM”).  Securing the CRM’s 
participation is ideal; if that role is defined within the Target, the CRM 
likely knows more about the “known unknowns” and may be a first-
person resource for the M&A Team work generally as well, as part of the 
organizational change.
202
  Another avenue of inquiry, if there is no central 
policy or point of responsibility, is into existing information governance 
projects, where at least half of most global organizations will have 
between two and seven disjointed but simultaneous IG projects.
203
   
 
[88] The DDT may also inquire into Legal Holds from the perspective 
of the IG professionals, where best practices for those individuals have 
long held that IG and other IT professionals contemplating archiving 
efforts or other big-ticket IG projects “should work with legal and 
compliance professionals to create rules for retaining only the data that is 
necessary, usually no more than three years’ worth, or that which has had 
a ‘litigation hold’ placed on it.”204  The IG practitioners may be even more 
painfully aware of cases where legal never rescinded an expired litigation 
hold.
205
  Finally, any Data Maps uncovered during the DDT’s examination 
of IG practices might also be tied back to the legal hold analysis.
206
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[89] As with legal hold practices, there simply may not be one 
individual responsible; these efforts may have been split into ad hoc 
practices within divisions, or even ignored or postponed entirely.  Many 
organizations face uncertainty as to who should be responsible for even 
basic IG efforts such as records retention and deletion policies, including 
who develops the policy, who monitors the policy, and who has 
authority.
207
 
 
[90] If there is no well-defined group or individual(s) assigned with IG 
responsibilities, the DDT may look to the IT department, as most 
organizations assign sole responsibility for electronic records retention 
policies to their IT departments despite “little or no training on the legal 
requirements of electronic document retention and deletion.”208  If a 
meeting with the IT department is similarly unsuccessful, the DDT may 
focus on legal and human resource departments to determine if there are 
ad hoc delegations there.  If these too are unsuccessful, then the DDT may 
begin to capture data sources through IT and the construction of a data 
map, and start to analyze those data sets as separate “known unknown” 
data sources that the Acquirer will have to remediate and harmonize. 
 
[91] The DDT analysis may begin with a simple IG matrix that divides 
IG efforts into five categories across the information lifecycle.  This 
lifecycle is typically dictated by: 
 
 “A business requirements for keeping the record because of its 
value;”  
 “A legal reason for keeping the record, such as investigation or 
a discovery request;” 
 “A regulatory reason, often dictated by an industry 
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standards;”209  
 Information of inherent value, such as leases, insurance 
policies, deeds, or the like; and 
 Information about the Deal itself, which includes both the 
memorialization of important Deal aspects as well as any 
information that supports the logic of the deal and will relate to 
potential claims in any lawsuits filed regarding the Deal. 
 
Within the broad framework of the five categories of information 
retention, a more refined analysis may address four additional, important 
responsibilities that the Acquirer will address post-Deal include: 
 
1. Harmonizing existing Target decisions with post-Deal 
compliance with Acquirer requirements, laws, and regulations; 
2. Implementing those retention decisions and the categorization 
of the information; 
3. Educating and training the Acquirer’s employees regarding the 
new information; and  
4. Enforcing and auditing these types of policy decisions 
 
The DDT will want to consider whether the Acquirer may achieve some of 
these goals by incorporating decision rights and accountability and 
policies aligned to business objectives that are monitored and measured 
according to compliance and assurance metrics within tolerances.
210
  The 
key here will be a plan that incorporates the backing and support of top 
management in each of these areas.  Without that support, compliance is 
difficult even if pivotal to avoiding court scrutiny. 
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[92] A prospective plan for effective information transition, 
harmonization, and future use may include the identification of an 
Acquirer Information Management Director who reports in some direct 
manner to upper level management; likely, the Chief Information Officer 
of the organization.
211
  Best practices indicate the Information 
Management Director would actually occupy a separate and distinct 
position from the IS or IT Director so that she can focus entirely on the 
“complicated and critical area of document management.”212 
 
[93] Ideal DDT practices will even go as far as inquiring into the 
existing IG practices and associated, defined retention requirements of the 
Acquirer.  Answers provide a better sense of how extensive the transition 
process will be.  The inquiry also includes the identification of Target 
information that will not necessarily be monetizable but important for 
governance purposes. 
 
[94] Other integration issues associated with diverse business efforts are 
implicated but not directed by IG, such as confirming that “the basic 
hardware and software relied upon by each organization is reasonably 
current, and how difficult it will be to make the organizations’ computers 
to talk to each other.”213  And, “if the integration of the two companies 
involves sharing data between companies’ systems—for example with 
sales or inventory data going into a financial accounting system,” the DDT 
will work with due diligence IT hardware consultants to determine 
whether the systems would allow for migration, “or whether an ‘interface’ 
program is required.”214 
 
[95] Finding an existing structure or memorializing the logical 
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underpinnings of an ad hoc structure are sometimes insufficient.  The 
DDT may also be tasked with confirming the purpose for the Target’s IG 
structure.  This is more than simply performing a basic maturity model 
analysis.  While existing IG practices and RIM policies may indicate how 
sophisticated the Target is as a whole, their intent has mattered to courts, 
where IG policies enacted in good faith are usually protected, but policies 
enacted for the wrong purpose(s) are suspect in nature.
215
 
 
[96] The DDT may, of course, confirm the effect of the IG structure.  
There is sometimes a gulf between policy and practice, and that gulf 
widens the more the Target’s efforts depend on human action and less on 
technological implementation.  Here, an examination into how auto-delete 
(or other mechanical remediation efforts) operates is crucial.  While courts 
have found “nothing necessarily improper about a company’s reasonable 
pre-litigation document retention policy whereby documents are disposed 
of in periodic intervals,”216 fact finders have begun to delve into parties’ 
information governance issues or lack thereof;
217
 and “[g]enerally 
speaking, spoliation arguments are unsuccessful if relevant documents 
were destroyed in accordance with the business’[s] reasonable document 
retention policy and/or practices.  However, even a reasonable practice of 
destroying documents may have unintended consequences.”218 
 
[97] This inquiry into effect may determine, despite a formal or 
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informal structure, how the IG efforts actually function.  Here, studies 
indicate that the DDT may expect to find that most Targets of reasonable 
maturity will  
 
[H]ave well-developed retention and disposition schedules 
for their paper records and electronic data, . . . [but] 
approximately 25% are not routinely destroying outdated 
records and ESI, and 50% have an approval process that 
adds a layer of decision making on top of the disposition 
schedule, rendering it largely ineffective because decision 
makers are averse to disposing of records and ESI, even 
when no longer needed for business purposes, subject to 
legal retention requirements, or subject to a formal 
litigation hold.
219
   
 
[98] The DDT must then determine, if the policies are not applied or 
followed, where the information is stored.  In the near past, information 
with no business purpose, legal hold requirement, or regulatory purpose 
was “found on employee desktops, shared drives, offline storage, and 
legacy system media.”220  This has expanded further into the myriad of 
locations available to employees, which include company-sponsored or 
endorsed efforts (such as BYOD practices) or non-sanctioned, employee-
driven instances of shadow IT.  The DDT may find and quantify what it 
can, with the reasonable assumption that at least the operation of this 
diligence is identifying the “known unknowns” and perhaps cutting down 
                                                     
219
 Withers, supra note 3, at 544–45 (citing CAROL STAINBROOK ET AL., COHASSET 
ASSOCS INC., ELECTRONICALLY STORED INFORMATION (ESI)—LEGAL HOLDS & 
DISPOSITION 12 (2012), at 1, 12, available at 
http://www.cohasset.com/retrievePDF.php?id=15, archived at http://perma.cc/M54Q-
EF4D). 
 
220
 Withers, supra note 3, at 578 (citing Kenneth J. Withers, Electronically Stored 
Information: The December 2006 Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 4 
NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 171, 174 (2006)) (discussing how replicated ESI causes a 
“tremendous volume” of information on a computer system). 
 
Richmond Journal of Law & Technology                              Volume XXI, Issue 2 
 
58 
 
on the “unknown unknowns.” 
 
[99] That unknown data represents a departure from normal records and 
information management RIM practices—if data is being properly 
managed, it is “known.”  There are statutory obligations to proper RIM 
function for specific types of corporate records,
221
 and there are common 
law obligations as well.  While document retention policies have been 
condoned in Zubulake V
222
 and by the U.S. Supreme Court in Arthur 
Andersen,
223
 courts have considered—and have been adjudicating—the 
general operation of organizations’ RIM policies at least as early as 1984, 
when the Southern District of Florida found that an organization “failed to 
demonstrate that its document retention policy [was] actually implemented 
in any consistent manner . . . [and that its] absolute failure to provide any 
evidence on this issue must be construed as a tacit admission that the 
policy is a sham.”224  And the court in In re Prudential involved sanctions 
levied, in part, for Prudential’s lack of a “comprehensive document 
retention policy with informative guidelines . . . .”225  Finally, the DDT’s 
perspective is not to save everything at the point of integration with the 
Target; the DDT has the Deal firmly in mind as an opportunity to engage 
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with a valid document retention policy under ordinary circumstances”). 
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in record remediation and deletion efforts as well.
226
 
 
E.  Due Diligence and Record Keeping for the Deal Itself 
  
[100] Suggested use of the DDT might include two components of 
capturing the DDT diligence.  First, the DDT will clearly manage and 
maintain the due diligence work it performs.  Second, the DDT may also 
be among the chief custodians of the Deal information generally; that is, 
the “documents, data, and evidentiary records created during the Due 
Diligence process” that “comprise one of the most important sets of 
information that an organization possesses.”227  In addition to the DDT’s 
investigative efforts, maturity model analysis, and post-Deal integration 
modeling, the DDT may also seek to maintain available Deal documents, 
such as:  
 
 Merger or acquisition agreements; 
 Financial documents; 
 Strategic plans;  
 Technology plans; 
 Inventories of organizational assets;  
 Copyrights or patents that literally “seal the Deal;”228 and 
 “[C]opies of relevant contracts and related Deal negotiating 
history”.229 
 
The DDT—or other responsible party—must understand that inadequate 
Deal documentation or its misplacement can create high dollar losses for 
                                                     
226
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Acquirers where, due to contested Deals, “the need to create serious RIM 
support for Due Diligence processes is self-evident.”230  A properly 
employed DDT may be uniquely placed to assist with this record-keeping 
function, as advanced planning for recording information associated with 
the Deal is traditionally underserved due to the Deal’s immediacy and the 
fact that “storage, retrieval, retention, and preservation issues [are] often 
not realized until after a record is created.”231 
 
[101] This is yet another component whose time has come, because 
despite the traditional ad hoc nature of deal record keeping that common 
to most organizations, the absence here has “particularly grave 
consequences when the value of some [Deal] documents may be very high 
(possibly worth millions of dollars) and the risk of loss increases 
drastically as the complexity of M&A workflow rises.”232 
 
[102] Managing information and following good record keeping 
practices (as well as asking the right questions during the Deal) is not just 
a risk mitigation strategy—executives may use Deal activities as an 
opportunity “to build decisional consensus and document the rationale for 
the M&A by initiating excellence in Due Diligence recordkeeping.”233  
Here too, the absence of a systematic practice has “contribut[ed] to well-
known M&A disasters.”234 
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 Id.; see also Mary DiMaggio, The Top 10 Best (and Worst) Corporate Mergers of All 
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[103] With increases in the sophistication of shareholder derivative suits, 
Acquirers need to “retain evidentiary records longer and be more capable 
of controlling records that are collaboratively shared” during the Deal.235  
This control may include a so-called “stop the presses” provision that 
provides a post-Deal workflow where IT or IG confirms with the 
Acquirer’s attorneys, and/or HR, and/or the IG before overwriting data.236  
This provision would be incorporated into a Deal-oriented “Records 
Retention Policy (and in a separate Litigation-Hold Protocol, if any); and a 
Separation Policy/Checklist.”237 
 
F.  Synergies, Cross-Pollination, and the Conclusion of the 
Process 
 
[104] As described in passing above, the framework provides synergies 
across each separate section of DDT’s due diligence questioning.  Just as 
this type of due diligence is necessary for the Acquirer because so many 
organizations operate in silos, DDT inquiries must keep firmly in mind the 
desired outcome: successful integration of the Target into the Acquirer, 
the realistic means by which this may occur, and the realistic costs 
associated with those efforts.  That consolidation of services provides a 
team focus “on risk management for process issues and on data conversion 
for technology issues.”238 
 
[105] This implicates a combination approach focused on systems 
integration, rather than a transformation approach with an emphasis on 
innovation.
239
  This combination approach may also incorporate some 
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parts of a traditional preservation approach, where “stakeholder 
management is the focal point of process issues, while communication 
between business units is key for technology concerns.”240  With that in 
mind, even though the DDT focus is on a point-by-point analysis and 
presentation on discrete identifiable issues (and, where appropriate, 
specific dollar amounts associated with addressing those issues), the DDT 
will also consider issues as part of a strategic package that will give a 
better overall chance for post-Deal success. 
 
[106] In sum, the diligence may provide the memorialization of the 
interviews with key Target SMEs; construct a data map or maps of 
existing data information held according to existing IG practices as well as 
exceptions relating to Legal Holds; and note how the identified 
information is impacted by DP and IS considerations and restrictions.  
When performed with the assistance of an appropriate service provider, as 
detailed further in the next section, the DDT may also assign dollar 
amounts to discrete actions the Acquirer will undertake as part of the 
Deal’s harmonization or remediation efforts. 
 
VI.  Due Diligence Pricing Framework 
 
A.  Professional Services 
 
[107] The pricing framework we suggest for the practitioner and service 
provider model is divided into two components.  First, the DDT will 
consider the strategic risk assessment component, which is comprised of 
the policies and procedures governing the movement of the data from the 
Target to the Acquirer.  Second, the DDT and service provider will catalog 
the Target’s data volume, and utilize calculations to create or bid on 
subsequent Acquirer integration or disposal efforts. 
 
[108] To address DP concerns within the first step, the DDT would 
determine whether the Acquirer desires to transmit any existing PII from 
the Target.  If that is the case, the DDT might outline a framework for 
                                                     
240
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Acquirer policy considerations; determine safe harbor implications; look 
at the specific mechanisms by which that data would be modified, stored, 
and utilized; and consider whether notifications to the individuals from 
whom the PII was collected would be required. 
 
[109] For IS concerns, the DDT will, among other things, evaluate the 
costs of evaluating existing IS practices and determine any necessary 
changed (e.g., if any permissions or password protections need to be 
modified).  On the e-Discovery side, the DDT will determine the current 
and potential legal hold structure, existing legal hold data, and also outline 
a process by which chain-of-custody information would travel with any 
data transfers.  In many instances, the DDT would arrange for a 
subsequent attorney review to determine which legal holds had expired, 
and work toward remediating related data stores.  Finally, the DDT would 
evaluate the existing IG structures (e.g., policies and record retention 
schedules) and determine what an effective harmonization plan would 
require. 
 
B.  Traditional IT Practices 
 
[110] To implement many of the strategic points above and assist with 
the second step of the pricing framework, service provider professionals 
will assist DDT practitioners in the broad areas of collection, processing, 
de-duplicating, formatting, categorizing, and integrating data into the 
Acquirer’s data environment.  At its most basic of level, the DDT will 
identify discrete data stores and determine a strategic approach to dealing 
with those stores; the service provider will review the strategy, quantify 
the data amounts, and price out the discrete services listed above. 
 
C.  Emerging Technologies 
 
[111] In addition to collecting the data in the Acquirer’s preferred 
method or merely categorizing it in-place, service providers may utilize 
the same type of data management tools utilized in traditional IG 
practices, which include: 
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 “De-duplication tools to eliminate duplicate documents; 
 Dynamic archiving tools to move older data to cheaper storage 
[or eliminating it entirely]; 
 Organizational tools to classify and search; 
 Retirement tools to capture application data at sun-setting.”241  
 
Newer strategies also incorporate file analysis (“FA”) tools which 
“analyze, index, search, track and report on file metadata and, in some 
cases, file content.”242  These types of tools give additional data on 
electronic information, “not only by reporting on simple file attributes, but 
also by providing detailed metadata and contextual information to enable 
better information governance and storage management actions.”243 
 
[112] Service providers may also be key for strategic IG harmonization 
efforts relating to structured or database data, where a portion of the 
integration efforts focuses on moving “legacy enterprise information 
archiving systems to [the Acquirer or a] next generation, on-premises, or 
SaaS [(Software as a Service)] products or services.”244  The service 
provider may even work with the Acquirer to determine whether many of 
the Target’s information assets would be better served by off-site storage 
or in an archiving tool, “for storage management, e-Discovery, 
compliance, indexing, search and business or market analysis.”245 
 
[113] Some service providers have sought to differentiate their services 
from traditional means of data analysis, and have touted a number of 
                                                     
241
 PALOMINO & VANCIL, supra note 60, at 9. 
 
242
 CALDWELL, supra note 61, at 11. 
 
243
 Id. at 6. 
 
244
 LOGAN ET AL., supra note 61, at 3.  
 
245
 Id. at 3. 
 
Richmond Journal of Law & Technology                              Volume XXI, Issue 2 
 
65 
 
technologies that may be incorporated into this space.  These include some 
“machine learning”246 or “predictive coding”247 analytical processes that 
are coming of age within the M&A due diligence process; for example, 
the use of “concept search tools—already somewhat widely deployed in 
the litigation context—to speed and focus the diligence process, appears to 
be an impending development.”248 
 
[114] There are some cautions surrounding the use of these tools, as most 
experience with these tools has come through their use in e-Discovery, 
where “a machine filters documents into one of two categories: responsive 
or not.  But in the world of IG, there are many, many more categories to 
which records are assigned.”249  That is, when: 
 
Searching legal documents, one is typically looking for 
short passages of important operative language that will 
affect: the disclosure against a representation in a deal 
document; the need for third-party consents; termination 
requirements; or other matters affecting the value of the 
target or of the relevant assets. Although the passage may 
have huge practical impact for the transaction, most times it 
will: (1) only occur once; and (2) use of language very 
similar to the content of many other legal documents of the 
same nature.
250
 
 
[115] This is the brave new frontier for IG, but current thinking holds 
that the “[t]ask of sifting through this data is especially suited for the use 
of predictive coding because these pools of information are so incredibly 
                                                     
246
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large.”251  The premise is that predictive coding and similar technologies 
allow IG practitioners to train the system to parse all of this data and 
categorize it—remediating the unneeded information, and migrating the 
remainder to the Acquirer.
252
  In fact, once a service provider has worked 
with the Acquirer’s existing IG policies and schedules, the service 
provider may find potential efficiencies within the Acquirer’s current (i.e., 
pre-Target data) environment; even when organizations “have developed 
good information governance policies, ever increasing data sets may make 
it difficult for the company to apply data policies,” and where a service 
provider has done the legwork to codify the Acquirer’s policies and 
integrated them with a tool with an information governance function, 
“predictive coding can be used as a strategic information governance tool” 
and where predictive coding can apply a policy to an organization’s data 
sets in a large scale fashion, against  e-mail, “archived data, active files, 
and even unstructured data.”253 
 
D.  Informed, Incentivized Participants May Lead to More 
Accurate Pricing 
 
[116] After involvement with the DDT and the review of the collected 
policies, related information, and the DDT data maps, an informed service 
provider is positioned best to give hard numbers to those discrete, 
quantifiable tasks the DDT process will raise.  As envisioned and 
implemented, the DDT would integrate a service provider team into the 
interview and assessment process; the service provider would, in effect, 
bid on the post-Deal tasks, and these bids would be presented as a portion 
of the potential post-Deal cost to the Acquirer.  This creates incentives 
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regarding two points for the service provider, which introduce efficiencies 
to the deal. 
 
[117] Under these circumstances, the DDT and service provider team are 
committed to bringing back dollar figures to the Deal negotiation, such 
that the Target and Acquirer can use those figures, among others, to 
negotiate the proper price and structure of the Deal.  That, in effect, 
finalizes the work performed by the team; however, both the DDT and 
service provider likely want the relationship with the Acquirer to continue, 
and will bid the services for the post-Deal work appropriately, such that 
they are not underbid for the post-Deal work once the Deal is completed.   
 
[118] This format provides the first incentive, even more powerful since 
the service provider is in the best position to determine exactly what those 
costs might be, and will bid accordingly in an effort to secure the work.  
Second, as indicated briefly above, once the service provider has done 
work with the Acquirer and learned the Acquirer’s policies, schedules, and 
systems, service providers understand that existing client relationships are 
traditionally easier paths to additional opportunities.
254
 
 
E.  Fact Patterns and Service Provider Participation 
 
[119] To demonstrate how service providers might evaluate quantifiable 
post-Deal integration and remediation tasks, we compiled three distinct 
fact patterns of varying levels of complexity that would correspond 
generally to the type of data map or maps returned by the operation of the 
DDT.  Each included different types of information, storage media 
(including paper documents), volumes, and character (e.g., identical data 
types retained for very different purposes). 
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F.  Exemplar Calculations—Public Information 
 
[120] There was quite a bit of latitude among online sources of vendor 
information, with costs ranging up to $30,000 per gigabyte of calibrated 
data,
255
 which
 
included “culling, organizing, and reviewing” the data.256  
To derive a more simplistic formula to illustrate the framework, we began 
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with the basics.  For old-fashioned paper stored in banker’s boxes, 
research indicated that there were between 2,000 and 2,500 pages per 
box.
257
  We used the mean for our calculation of 2,250 pages per banker’s 
box figure to estimate the costs of scanning the information into ESI form.  
Here, we used the industry standard $.05 per page
258
 for scanning and 
Optical Character Recognition (“OCR”): 
 
One banker’s box x 2,250 x $.05 = $112.5 per banker’s box scanning 
and OCR cost 
 
Next, we determined how many GB of ESI each banker’s box represented 
after the scanning and OCR steps, reverse engineering research indicating 
that Microsoft
®
 Word
®
 files averaged 64,783 pages per GB.
259
  With 
2,250 pages per banker’s box, this provided the following GB equation: 
 
2,250/64,783 = .03473 GB per banker’s box 
 
Costs associated with the next step of the process—processing—are 
falling, from $350 to $1,200
260
 per GB in late 2012 to recent estimates 
ranging from $150 to $300.
261
  We assumed a $250 per GB price for 
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processing, and used that price across most sources of ESI for our 
estimated costs.  For example, one banker’s box of paper data scanned, 
OCR’ed, and processed would cost the following: 
 
(2,250p x $.05) + (0.03473 x $250.00)  
or  
($112.50) + ($8.68) = $121.18 
 
With native, collected ESI (in contrast to the ESI created from paper), 
Acquirers may gain efficiencies associated with processing less ESI per 
GB collected by deNISTing and deduplicating collected files via indexes 
and other pre-processing steps.
262
  But for purposes of our rough-hewn 
calculations, we will assume that these steps occur across data post-
processing. 
 
[121] We next assumed that our deNISTing and deduplicating processes 
would eliminate 80% of the ESI kept generally within an organization, and 
perhaps 65% of the higher-quality ESI dataset represented by the 
information kept due to existing legal holds.  We assumed that the paper 
documents converted to ESI would not have the same range of 
elimination, based both on the limitations associated with the OCR 
process, as well as the thought that organizations would be less likely to 
keep duplicate paper files than electronic ones. 
 
[122] Then to evaluate the data kept, we imagined the use of a service 
provider analysis step applied to each data set to extract information of 
                                                                                                                                    
see also Kiwi Camara, Future of Legal Big Data, CS DISCO (Feb. 18, 2014), 
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value about the information, to determine what data should be kept—and 
how.  Our hypotheticals frame the analytical step as an application of 
predictive coding or technology assisted review; however, other options, 
including even simple or complex Boolean searches, may accomplish 
similar aims.
263
  Estimated per-GB costs for analytical tools ranged from 
$250–$700 in 2013;264 we assumed $400 as a middle ground, appreciating 
that costs should continue to fall as technologies become more 
commoditized. 
 
[123] Running this analytical process against the data would provide the 
means by which the Acquirer could then properly categorize and store (or 
defensibly dispose of) information acquired from the Target.   
 
[124] For the different media, our equations are: 
 
1 Banker’s Box (1BB) 
(2,250p x $.05) + (.03473GB x $250.00pro) + (.03473GB x $400.00anl) 
or 
($112.50) + ($8.68) + ($13.89) = $135.07 
 
1 GB of Information Governance or non-Legal Hold unstructured 
data (1GB IG GB) 
(1GB IG x $250.00pro) + (1GB IG x .2 x $400.00anl) 
or 
($250.00) + ($80.00) = $330.00 
 
1 GB of Legal Hold unstructured data (1GB LH) 
(1GB LH x $250.00pro) + (1GB LH x .35 x $400.00anl)  
or  
                                                     
263
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($250.00) + ($140.00) = $390.00 
 
Applied to the fact patterns presented, we determined the following: 
 
 
Cloud E-mail and Files 
30 custodians 
5 GB/custodian 
Paper Boxes 
100 Discrete 
2,250 pages/Box 
Legal Hold Data 
2 Matters 
5 GB/Matter  
RIM Evaluation 
600 GB (.6 TB) 
Legal Hold Data 
10 GB 
Paper Boxes 
6,225,000 pages/ 
3.473 GB 
Processing 600 GB to  
Database @ $250/GB 
=$150,000 
Scanning and OCR @ 
$.05/page = 
$311,250 
Processing 10 GB to  
Database @ $250/GB 
=$2,500 
Processing 3.473 GB 
to Database @ $250/
GB =$868 
Analytical Tools  
.2 x 600 GB @ $400/
GB =$48,000 
Analytical Tools  
.35 x 10 GB @ $400/
GB =$1,400 
Analytical Tools 
3.473 GB @ $400/GB 
= 1,389 
Subtotal  
$198,000 
Subtotal  
$3,900 
Subtotal 
$313,507 
Grand Total 
$515,407 
Figure D 
Richmond Journal of Law & Technology                              Volume XXI, Issue 2 
 
73 
 
 
 
 
 
E-mail Servers 
100 custodians 
3 GB/custodian  
File Servers 
25 Discrete 
4 GB/Server 
Personal Computers  
85 Discrete 
25 GB/Computer 
Paper Boxes 
2,500 Discrete 
2,250 pages/Box 
Legal Hold Data 
20 Matters 
20 GB/Matter 
RIM Evaluation 
2,525 GB (2.525 TB) 
Legal Hold Data 
400 GB 
Paper Boxes 
5,625,000 pages/ 
86.83 GB 
Processing 2.525TB 
to Database @ $250/
GB =$631,250  
Scanning and OCR @ 
$.05/page = 
$281,250 
Processing 400 GB to 
Database @ $250/GB 
=$25,000 
Processing 86.83 GB 
to Database @ $250/
GB =$21,708 
Analytical Tools .2 x 
2.525 TB @ $400/GB 
=$202,000 
Analytical Tools .35 x 
400 GB @ $400/GB 
=$56,000 
Analytical Tools 
86.83 GB @ $400/GB 
=$34,732 
Subtotal  
$833,250 
Subtotal  
$156,000 
Subtotal  
$337,690 
Grand Total  
$1,326,940 
Figure E 
300 GB 
100 GB 
2125 GB 
Richmond Journal of Law & Technology                              Volume XXI, Issue 2 
 
74 
 
 
 
Further, we would then incorporate project management fees varying from 
$50–$275 per hour based on service provider time;265 attorney time would 
also factor into this analysis. 
  
                                                     
265
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a Surprise, IN-HOUSE LITIGATOR 25:1 (2010), reprinted in Pretrial Practice and 
Discovery 4, ABA (2011). 
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2,625 GB (2.625 TB) 
Legal Hold Data 
400 GB 
BYOD Device Data 
100 GB 
Paper Boxes 
6,225,000 pages/ 
96.09 GB 
Processing 2.625 TB 
Database @ $250/GB 
=$656,250 
Scanning and OCR @ 
$.05/page = 
$311,250 
Processing 400 GB to 
Database @ $250/GB 
=$100,000 
Processing 5% to 
Database @ $250/GB 
=$25,000 
Processing 96.09 GB 
to Database @ $250/
GB =$24,023 
Analytical Tools .2 x 
262.5 TB @ $400/GB 
=$210,000 
Analytical Tools .35 x 
400 GB @ $400/GB 
=$56,000 
Analytical Tools  
5 GB @ $400/GB  
=$2,000 
Analytical Tools 
96.09 GB @ $400/GB 
=$38,436 
Subtotal  
$866,250 
Subtotal  
$156,000 
Subtotal 
$27,000 
Subtotal 
$373,709 
Grand Total 
$1,422,959 
Figure F 
300 GB 
100 GB 
2125 GB 
100 GB 
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[125] Finally, as imagined by this paper’s framework, practitioners 
would address IS and DP concerns according to the specific needs of the 
Deal, exemplified simply as: 
 
 
G.  Service Provider Figure Proposed Research 
 
[126] If we investigate further, we propose soliciting the participation of 
service providers within the IG and e-Discovery space, providing them 
with this scholarship as well as the original fact patterns, asking them to 
consider each fact pattern.  We would allow the service providers to 
determine what portion(s) of each fact pattern they would address, the 
technology they would use, and even how they would characterize the 
results of their efforts, along with the pricing they would provide.  
Information shared during this process would be kept confidential vis-à-
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vis each service provider, unless (a) the service provider gave permission 
to share their methodology and/or pricing; and (b) at least ten service 
providers wished to share their particulars publicly. 
 
 
VII.  CONCLUSION 
  
[127] We submit that a framework which considers DP, IS, e-Discovery, 
and IG issues and their associated costs to the Acquirer during a Deal may 
provide greater insight into the true overall “cost” of the Deal under the 
appropriate circumstances.  Due to the overlapping interests between each 
of the specialties, a framework that takes all four into account (as well as 
information about the Deal itself) may create efficiencies when 
determining a strategy for post-Deal information transfer, evaluation, 
integration, and disposal—working to avoid duplicative efforts while 
focusing on the most important data sets identified through the due 
diligence process.  The associated costs may be further refined through the 
incentivized structure provided by including the service providers as due 
diligence team participants, who effectively bid for project work from a 
position of near-insider information while still operating from a need to 
secure project work post-Deal.   
 
[128] Finally, in addition to presenting a more accurate Deal cost, the 
operation of the framework may better define for the Acquirer the risks 
associated with the Deal: both before the Deal is consummated, by 
evaluating the point along the maturity model at which the Target exists; 
and after the Deal, by considering and providing a process for dealing with 
data privacy, data security, information governance, and e-Discovery 
requirements and concerns.  We do not submit that this type of analysis is 
effective or even appropriate for every type of deal, but hope that it 
continues to gain popularity within the M&A space as an addition to every 
slate of considered due diligence practices.  
 
